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Larsen: Right to Counsel

NOTE
UNITED STATES v. COVARRUBIAS:

DOES THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ADD TO THE AMBIGUITY OF THE
INEXTRICABLY INTERTWINED
EXCEPTION?
I. INTRODUCTION

In 1991, the United States Supreme Court in McNeil v.
Wisconsin 1. held that the Sixth Amendment to the United
2
States Constitution right to counsel is offense specific. The
offense specific requirement prohibits government initiated
interrogation regarding an offense to which the right to counsel has attached. 3 However, many federal circuit and state

1 See
2

McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171 (1991).

See McNeil, 501 U.S. at 175. The McNeil court relied on Maine IJ. Moulton, 474
U.S. 159, 179-180 (1985) in recognizing that the police have an interest in investigating new or additional crimes. See id. at 175-176. The McNeil court then reasoned that
to exclude evidence pertaining to charges as to which the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel had not attached at the time the evidence was obtained, simply because other
charges were pending at that time, would unnecessarily frustrate the public's interest
in the investigation of criminal activities. See id. at 176. Furthermore, the McNeil
Court maintained that any departure from the offense specific nature of the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel would have the unacceptable entailment that most persons in pretrial custody for serious offenses would be unapproachable by police officers
suspecting them of involvement in other crimes, even though they have never expressed any unwillingness to be questioned. See id. at 181.
3 See McNeil, 501 U.S. at 175. The McNeil court explained that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is offense specific because this right does not attach until the
initiation of adversary judicial proceedings. See id. To hold otherwise would seriously
impede effective law enforcement. See id. at 181. The Sixth Amendment states, in

1
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courts recognize two exceptions to the offense specific requirement. 4 First, the offense specific requirement does not apply if
the two offenses are inextricably intertwined such that the
right to counsel for the pending charge cannot constitutionally
be isolated from the right to counsel for the uncharged offense. 5
Second, the offense specific requirement does not apply if the
government breaches its affirmative obligation not to act in a
manner that circumvents and thereby dilutes the protection
afforded by the right to counsel. 6 Based on these two excep-

pertinent part: "The accused shall enjoy the right to ... have the Assistance of counsel
for his defence." See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
4 See Taylor v. Florida, 726 So.2d 841, 844-845 (lst Cir. 1999); United States v.
Mitcheltree, 940 F.2d 1329, 1341-1342 (lOth Cir. 1991); United States v. Melgar, 139
F.3d 1005, 1013-15 (4th Cit. 1998); United States v. Arnold, 106 F.3d 37,41-42 (3d Cir.
1997); United States v. Cooper, 949 F.2d 737, 743-44 (5th Cir. 1991); Whittlesey v.
Maryland, 665 A.2d 223,236 (Md. 1995); People v. Clankie, 530 N.E.2d 448, 451-453
(TIl. 1988); United States v. Terzado-Madruga, 897 F.2d 1099, 1109-1110 (11th Cir.
1990); United States v. Hines, 963 F.2d 255, 257-258 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v.
Kidd, 12 F.3d 30, 33-34 (4th Cir. 1993).

See United States v. Cooper, 949 F.2d 737, 743-744 (5th Cir. 1991) (uncharged
federal offense of unlawful possession of an unregistered firearm was not inextricably
intertwined with pending state charge of armed robbery); United States v. Hines, 963
F.2d 255, 257-258 (9th Cir. 1992) (uncharged federal offense of firearms not inextricably intertwined with same state offense); United States v. Kidd, 12 F.3d 30, 33-34 (4th
Cir. 1993) (series of cocaine sales were not inextricably intertwined with the cocaine
sale that post-dated arraignment); United States v. Arnold, 106 F.3d 37, 41-42 (3d Cir.
1997) (intimidation of witness was closely related with attempted murder of the same
witness); Hendricks v. Vasquez, 974 F.2d 1099, 1104-1105 (9th Cir. 1992) (interstate
flight to avoid prosecution was not inextricably intertwined with murder); United
States v. Nocella, 849 F.2d 33, 37-38 (lst Cir. 1988) (the federal crime of distributing
or conspiring to distribute cocaine was not inextricably intertwined with earlier state
charges of possession of marijuana); United States v. Carpenter, 963 F.2d 736, 740-741
(5th Cir. 1992) (the firearm charge was not inextricably intertwined with burglary
charge); United Sates v. Mitcheltree, 940 F.2d 1329, 1341-1342 (10th Cir. 1991) (witness tampering was closely related with charged MDMA accounts); United States v.
Walker, 148 F.3d 518, 529-530 (5th Cir. 1998) (suborning of perjury was not inextricably intertwined with the charged possession of firearm offense); People v. Clankie, 530
N.E.2d 448, 451-453 (Ill. 1988) (three burglary offenses were inextricably intertwined).
5

6 See Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 176 (l985). If the federal and state authorities worked together in shuffiing the defendant's charge from the state to the federal
system, the defendant may suppress evidence based on the circumvention of right
exception. See United States v. Martinez, 972 F.2d 1100, 1105 (9th Cir. 1992). See also
United States v. Mitcheltree, 940 F.2d 1329, 1342-1343 (lOth Cir. 1991); United States
v. Melgar, 139 F.3d 1005, 1013-1015 (4th Cir. 1998); United States v. Arnold, 106 F.3d
37, 41-42 (3d Cir. 1997); United States v. Kidd, 12 F.3d 30, 33-34 (4th Cir. 1993);
United States v. Cooper, 949 F.2d 737, 743-44 (5th Cir. 1991); Hendricks v. Vasquez,
974 F.2d 1099, 1104-1105 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v. Hines, 963 F.2d 255, 257-
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tions, many defendants claim that their incriminating statements regarding a prospective charge should be suppressed. 7
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit addressed one such challenge in United States v. Covarrubias. s
In Covarrubias, the Ninth Circuit held that the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel attached only to Covarrubias' and
Ochoa's state kidnapping offense, not the federal crime of
transporting an illegal alien. 9 Thus, the government was prohibited from initiating an interrogation concerning the state
kidnapping offense. lo Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit held
that, because the crime of kidnapping and transporting illegal
aliens were inextricably intertwined, the statements made to
United States Immigration and Naturalization Service (hereinafter, "I.N.S.") Agent Gonzalez must be suppressed. l l
In Part II, this Note discusses Covarrubias' facts and procedural history. Part III outlines the history of the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel, with an emphasis on the inextricably intertwined exception. Part IV analyzes the Ninth Circuit's reasoning in Covarrubias. Part V critiques this reasoning
in light of the strong presumption against the finding of the
application of the inextricably intertwined exception. Finally,
Part VI concludes that the Ninth Circuit properly suppressed

258 (9th Cir. 1992); People v. Clankie, 530 N.E.2d 448, 451-452 (Dl. 1988); Whittlesey
v. Maryland, 665 A.2d 223, 235 (Md. 1995); United States v. Terzado-Madruga, 897
F.2d 1099, 1109-1110 (11th Cir. 1990); Taylor f. Florida, 726 So. 2d 841, 844 (1st Cir.
1999).
7

s

See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.

See United States v. Covarrubias, 179 F.3d 1219 (9th Cir. 1999). The appeal from
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington was argued
and submitted March 9, 1999 before Circuit Judge William A. Fletcher, Circuit Judge
Stephen R. Reinhardt and Circuit Judge Sidney R. Thomas. The decision was filed on
June 14, 1999. Circuit Judge Reinhardt authored the opinion.
9

See id. at 1223. The right to counsel attached to the state kidnapping charge at
the defendants' preliminary hearing, when adversarial judicial proceedings had been
initiated against the defendants. See id.
10

.

See id.

11

See id. at 1226. The Ninth Circuit did not consider the second exception, the circumvention of the Sixth Amendment right, because either exception provides an independent basis for suppressing evidence. See Covarrubias, 179 F.3d at 1226.
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the defendant's incriminating statements obtained by I.N.S.
Agent Gonzalez, but would have set forth a stronger position
had the Ninth Circuit evaluated in addition, or, in the alternative, under the circumvention of right exception.
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On December 18, 1997, defendants Covarrubias and Ochoa
drove eight individuals, some of whom may have been undocumented immigrants, from Los Angeles, California to
Washington state in Covarrubias' van in return for payment. 12
Due to a dispute over money, Covarrubias and Ochoa dropped
everyone off in Washington except Hernandez. 13 Subsequently,
Hernandez's wife contacted the police and told them that the
Covarrubias and Ochoa held Hernandez for ransom. 14 The police supplied Mrs. Hernandez with $700.00 of marked currency
to meet the ransom demands. 15 When Mrs. Hernandez handed
over the marked currency to Covarrubias and Ochoa, the police
arrested them. 16
Aware that Hernandez was in the United States illegally,
the officers at Sunnyside Police Department had previously
enlisted the services of I.N.S. Agent Gonzalez. 17 At the Sun-

12

See id. at 1221.

13

See id. Apparently, the defendants called Mrs. Hernandez who was in Sunnyside
and told her that they were transporting her husband. See Brief for Appellant at 8,
United States v. Covarrubias, Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendant's Motion to Suppress (No. CA-98-30167).
The defendants forced Mr. Hernandez back into Covarrubias' van once Mrs. Hernandez was unable to pay. See id.
14

See Covarrubias, 179 F.3d at 1221. The Ninth Circuit believed that the police had
reason to believe that Hernandez was being held against his will because Hernandez's
wife told the police that the defendants were holding him for ransom. See id,
15

See id. With Hernandez's wife's cooperation, the Sunnyside police officers executed a plan to apprehend the defendants. See id. The police gave her $700 to give to
the defendants so that she could retrieve her husband. See id.
16

See Covarrubias, 179 F.3d at 1221.

17

See id. The State argued that although Agent Gonzalez participated in the planning of the arrest and the arrest itself, it did not necessarily indicate collusion between
the state and federal agents, since the I.N.S. agents frequently assist the Sunnyside
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nyside Police Department, Detective Jose Trevino questioned
Covarrubias while Officer Jarin WhitelylS questioned Ochoa
regarding the kidnapping charge. 19 Covarrubias and Ochoa
made incriminating statements regarding both the pending
2o
kidnapping and the federal illegal transportation charges.
After the interviews, the defendants were transported to the
Yakima County Jai1. 21
The following day, December 19, 1997, Covarrubias and
Ochoa appeared for a preliminary hearing on the state kidnapping charge before the Superior Court of the State of Washing23
ton. 22 The court appointed counsel for both defendants. Later
that day, I.N.S. Agent Gonzalez visited Yakima County Jail to
interview the defendants upon reading both defendants their
Miranda rights. 24 Both defendants waived their Miranda

Police Department and go to the Sunnyside jail every day. See Appellants' Brief at 1920, Covarrubias (No. CA-98-30167).
is

It should be noted that the District Court used the name "Officer Whitby,"
whereas the Ninth Circuit used the name "Officer Whitely:' It appears that the two
names refer to the same person. For ease of reference, Officer Whitely will be used
hereafter.
19

See Covarrubias, 179 F.3d at 1221.

20

See id. at 1221 n.2, n.1. The police asked who the van belonged to, how the defendants came to Sunnyside (which Covarrubias answered by explaining his agreement to transport Hernandez and the financial arrangement that was made), how
many other individuals were transported to Washington State, whether Hernandez
was detained against his will, and the nationality of the individuals involved in transporting. See id. at n.2. Covarrubias and Ochoa told the police officers that Covarrubias
and Ochoa claimed that Hernandez's wife was supposed to meet them with $900, $200
of which was to pay them for the ride and the remainder of which was to reimburse
them for a $700 payment they made on Hernandez's behalf to the people who had
brought him across the Mexican border. See id. at n.1.
21

See id. at 1222.

22 See Covarrubias, 179 F.3d at 1222. To be guilty of the state offense of First Degree Kidnapping, a person must intentionally abduct another person with the intent to
hold him for ransom or reward, or as a shield or hostage. See Revised Code of Washington 9A.040.020.

23

See Covarrubias, 179 F.3d at 1222.

24

See id. The Fifth Amendment states, in pertinent part: "No person... shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." See U.S. CONST.
amend. V. In interpreting the Fifth Amendment, the United States Supreme Court
held that the Fifth Amendment requires government officials during a custodial interrogation to warn a defendant that he or she has a right to remain silent, right to the
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rights. 25 Then, Gonzalez proceeded to interrogate Covarrubias
and Ochoa regarding the potential federal charge of transporting illegal aliens and the state kidnapping charge. 26
On February 5, 1998, the state dismissed without prejudice
its criminal kidnapping charges against Covarrubias and
Ochoa because of an alleged promise of federal prosecution for
27
charges arising out of the same incident. On March 3, 1998,
Covarrubias and Ochoa were indicted with two federal
charges: transporting and moving an illegal alien in violation
of 8 U.S.C. § 1324 (a) (1) (B) and forfeiture. 28

presence of attorney whether retained or appointed, and that any statement may be
used as evidence against him or her in order to preserve the Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). Therefore, the Fifth Amendment limits the government's ability to use defendant's self incriminating statements as evidence in a criminal proceeding. See Moran v. Burbine,
. 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986). In order for these statements to be admissible, these statements must be made knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently. See id. Further, a defendant's invocation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel during judicial proceeding does not constitute an invocation of the right to counsel derived by Miranda v.
Arizona, from the Fifth Amendment's guarantee against compelled self-incrimination.
See Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 175-182 (1985).
25 See Covarrubias, 179 F.3d at 1221-1222. The district court made a specific finding that both defendants voluntarily waived their Miranda rights to the Sunnyside
police officers and I.N.S. Agent Gonzalez. See Order Granting in Part and Denying in
Part Defendants' Motion to Suppress at 3-5, United States v. Covarrubias (No. CR-982030-RHW, No. CR-98-2031-RHW).

26.

.

See CovarrubUJ8, 179 F.3d at 1222 n.4. I.N.S. While the defendants were formally
charged with a kidnapping offense, I.N.S. Agent Gonzalez asked questions about the
defendants' immigration status, their transporting of other illegal immigrants to
Washington state and the financial arrangements for the trip, the defendants' prior
experience with transporting illegal immigrants, their knowledge of the immigration
status of the individuals they were transporting, what had happened regarding Hernandez's inability to pay, whether Hernandez had been forced to remain in the van
against his will, what statements the defendants had made to Hernandez, and
whether Hernandez had been kidnapped for ransom. See id. Although I.N.S. Agent
Gonzalez argued that he was not aware that the defendants had been arraigned and
counsel had been appointed, the court imputed knowledge to Agent Gonzalez, given
his experience, that he was aware that the defendants had been arraigned and counsel had been appointed. See id. at 1222 n .. 3.
27

See id. at 1222. Agent Gonzalez denied any promise of federal prosecution. See
Covarrubias, 179 F.3d at 1222 n.5.
28

See id. at 1222. The Ninth Circuit addressed only the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel claim. See id.
8 U.S.C. § 1321 (a)(I)(8) states, in pertinent part:
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On or about April 10, 1998, Covarrubias and Ochoa brought
a motion to suppress the statements made to Officer Whitley
29
and Detective Trevino. Additionally, the defendants sought to
suppress their statements made to I.N.S. Agent Gonzalez. 30
Both motions alleged Fifth Amendment,31 Sixth Amendment,32
33
and Vienna Convention violations. At the close of the evidentiary hearing on May 22, 1998, the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Washington rejected the de4
fendant's Fifth Amendmene and Vienna Convention claims. 35
Further, the district court denied the motion to suppress the

A person who violates (A) shall, for each alien be fined under title 18,
United States Co~e. (A) Criminal penalties apply to any person who
knows that a person is an alien, knowingly brings to or attempts to
bring to the United States in any manner whatsoever ... knowing or in
reckless disregard of the fact that an alien has come to, entered, or
remains in the United States in violation of law, transports, or moves
or attempts to transport or move such alien with the United States by
means of transportation or otherwise, in furtherance of such violation
of law; knowing or in reckless disregard ... conceals, harbors, or shields
from detection .. .including any builder or any means of transportation;
encourages or induces an alien to come to, enter, or reside in the
United States, knowing or in reckless disregard will be in violation of
law; or engages in any conspiracy to commit any order of the preceding
acts, or aids and abets the commission.
29

See Covarrubias, 179 F.3d at 1222.

30 See id. at 1222-1223.
31 See supra note 24 and accompanYing
. text.
32 See Covarrubias, 179 F.3d at 1222-1223. The Sixth Amendment states, in pertinent part: "The accused shall enjoy the right to ... have the Assistance of counsel for his
defence." See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

33 See Covarrubias, 179 F.3d at 1222-1223. Ochoa also argued that all of his statements must be suppressed because the investigating officers violated the Vienna convention by not advising him of his right to consult with Mexican consular officials. See
Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part at 6, Covarrubias (No. CR-98-2030-RHW,
No. CR-98-2031-RHW). Article 36 of the Vienna Convention of Consular Relations,
which states that a citizen of a party-State who is arrested by authorities of another
party-State shall be advised of the right to consult with consular officials. See 21
U.S.T. 77, Art. 36.
34

See Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part at 7-8, Covarrubias (No. CR-982030-RHW, No. CR-98-2031-RHW).

35 See

id. at 12-13. Relying on [n re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights
Litig., 978 F.2d 493, 503 (9th Cir. 1992), the district court held that treaty-created
rights are not enforceable by individuals unless they are either the subject of the implementing legislation or are deemed self executing, and therefore, the district court
denied Ochoa's motion to suppress because Ochoa points to no implementing statute
or regulation that would make the treaty effective. See id.
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statements made to Officer Whitely and Detective Trevino,
who were investigating the state kidnapping offense. 36
However, the district court found that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel had attached to the state kidnapping
charge. 37 As a result, the district court granted the motion to
suppress only statements regarding the violation of the Sixth
Amendment regarding the federal charge of transporting illegal aliens. 3s Accordingly, the district court suppressed the incriminating statements made to I.N.S. Agent Gonzalez concerning the defendants' transportation of illegal aliens from
California to Washington. 39
On May 28, 1998, the government filed an interlocutory ap40
peal. Under review, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the
crime of kidnapping and the federal transporting charges were
inextricably intertwined. 41 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit af-

36

.

See Covarrub/.a8, 179 F.3d at 1222-1223. See also supra notes 25, 33 and accompanying text.
37

See Order Granting in Part and Denying at 8, Covarrubias (No. CR-98-2030RHW, No. CR-98-2031-RHW). "It is not disputed that Defendants' Sixth Amendment
rights to counsel had attached and were invoked when they were appointed counsel
during their preliminary hearings." [d.
38

See id. The district court acknowledged that the Sixth Amendment right is offense specific. See id. at 9-10. The court concluded that the two exceptions to this rule
caused the right to counsel to extend to the federal charges because 1) federal transporting charges was so inextricably intertwined with the state kidnapping charge; and
2) by questioning the defendants, who had been arrested and charged as a result of a
joint state-federal effort, the federal government had acted to circumvent the defendants' right to counsel. See id.
39

See Order Granting in Part and Denying at 13-14, Covarrubias (No. CR-98-2030RHW, No. CR-98-2031-RHW).
40

See Covarrubias, 179 F.3d at 1223. See also Notice of Appeal at 1, United States
v. Covarrubias (No. 98-30167).
41

See Covarrubias, 179 F.3d at 1226. For clarity, closely related, extremely closely
related and inextricably intertwined all apparently seem to refer to the same exception. See id. at 1223 (using closely related and inextricably intertwined interchangeably); Commonwealth v. Rainwater, 681 N.E. 2d 1218, 1223 (Mass. 1997) (characterizing closely related and inextricably intertwined as "two terms which we take to mean
the same thing"); United States v. Melgar, 139 F.3d 1005, 1011 (4th Cir. 1998) (using
closely related and inextricably intertwined interchangeably); United States v. Arnold,
106 F.3d 37, 40-41 (3rd Cir. 1997) (characterizing closely related and inextricably
intertwined as "two terms which we take to mean the same thing."); United States v.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol30/iss1/5

8

Larsen: Right to Counsel

2000]

RIGHT TO COUNSEL

9

firmed the district court's ruling that ordered suppression of
the incriminating statements.
III. BACKGROUND

A. SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution
guarantees the right to have assistance of counsel in all criminal prosecutions. 42 In addition, the Sixth Amendment affords a
defendant the right to rely on counsel as a medium between
the defendant and the State. 43 The United States Supreme
Court views the right to counsel as indispensable to the fair
administration of our adversarial system of criminal justice.44
However, the Sixth Amendment explicitly guarantees the right
45
to counsel only upon the initiation of formal charges.

Carpenter, 963 F.2d 736, 740-41 (5th Cir. 1992) (extremely closely related used along
with inextricably intertwined).
42

See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation;
to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witness in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence." [d.
43 See Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 176 (1985). The Powell court was the first
mejor case where the United States Supreme Court discussed the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932).
44

See generally Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 428 (1986); Moulton, 474 U.S. at
170; Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682,687 (1972); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 401
(1977); Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 636 (1986); Hoffa v. United States, 385
U.S. 293, 308 (1966); Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292 (1990); Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335, 344-345, (1963); Powell, 287 U.S. at 68-69 (1932); Massiah v United
States, 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964). "In sum, the principle of Powell v. Alabama and succeeding cases requires that we scrutinize any pretrial confrontation of the accused to
determine whether the presence of counsel is necessary to preserve the defendant's
basic right to a fair trail as affected by his right meaningfully to cross-examine the
witnesses against him and to have effective assistance of counsel at the trial itself."
See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227 (1967).
45 See Moran, 475 U.S. at 431. For a discussion of the purpose and meaning of the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel, see Akhil Reed Amar, Sixth Amendment First
Principles, 84 GEO. L. J. 641, 705-711 (1996); Charles E. Torcia, 3 Wharton's Criminal
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In Kirby v. Illinois,46 the United States Supreme Court
ruled that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches only
at or immediately after the initiation of an adversarial judicial
proceeding whether by way of formal charge, preliminary
hearing, indictment, information or arraignment. 47 The Kirby
court reasoned that once a person stands formally accused of a
crime, he or she is vulnerable to certain critical stages in the
criminal justice process where the results if which might well
settle the accused's fate and reduce the trial itself to a mere
formality:8 Thus, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel extends to all critical stages of the criminal proceedings between
the accused and the forces of the government. 49 Once the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel attaches, any subsequent waiver
during a police-initiated custodial interview is presumptively
ineffective. 50 Furthermore, deliberate elicitation of incriminat-

Procedure, §§ 364-374, at 239-244 (13th ed. 1991 & We8t Supp. 1997) (discussing the
right to counsel).
46

See 406 U.S. 682 (1972) (plurality opinion).

47

See id. at 687-688. The Kirby plumlity held that its test encompassed all prior cases in which
the Court had found a Sixth Amendment right to counsel. See id. These cases included Coleman v.
Alabama, 399 U.S. I, 9-10 (1970) (plumlity opinion) (right to counsel attached at pre-indictment
preliminary hearing); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 236-37 (1967) (right to counsel attached
at post-indictment, pretrial lineup); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964) (right to
counsel attached at post-indictment interrogation); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 53-54 (1961)
(right to counsel attached at armignment); Moore v. Dlinois, 434 U.S. 220, 229-31 (1977) (right to
counsel attached for in-person identification at preliminary hearing because critical stage of prosecution); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 40 I (1977) (right to counsel attached at interrogation
after armignment because adversarial proceedings had begun).
48

See Kirby, 406 U.S. at 688-689. The Court explained that a person is entitled to
counsel once "the adverse positions of government and defendant have solidified,
where the government is not longer investigatory but accusatory." See id.
49

See Wade, 388 U.S. at 236-237. The Wade court defined a critical stage in the
criminal justice process as "where the results might well settle the accused's fate and
reduce the trial itself to a mere formality" or where there is a "potential substantial
prejudice to defendant's rights inheres in the particular confrontation and the ability
of right to counsel to help avoid prejudice." See id. at 224,227.
50

See Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 636 (1986). After the accused has requested counsel, the government may no longer question the defendant unless the
defendant initiates a conversation with the government. See id. It is incumbent upon
the State to prove "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or
privilege." See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938). The strict standard applies
equally to an alleged waiver of the right to counsel whether at trial or at a critical
stage of pretrial proceedings. See Wade, 388 U.S. at 236-237. The Wade Court ruled
that a waiver of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel not only requires comprehen-
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ing evidence from an accused after the right to counsel at51
taches violates the Sixth Amendment. Therefore, any statements obtained in violation of a defendant's right to counsel
52
are inadmissible.
53

In i964, Massiah v. United States marked the first instance in which the United States Supreme Court required the
exclusion of evidence based on a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 54 In Massiah, the defendant, Massiah,
made incriminating statements to a co-defendant, who had
placed a hidden radio transmitter under the front his automo55
bile. The United States Supreme Court excluded Massiah's
incriminating statements concerning pending charges surreptitiously coaxed by the government in the absence of counsel. 56

sion but also a relinquishment. See id. at 237. The United States Supreme Court has
afforded a presumption against an implied waiver of counsel because this right is
indispensable to the fair administration of justice. See id. Furthermore, the United
States Supreme Court has held that a valid waiver only exists when it is a product of
free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception, and when
the waiver is made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it. See id.
51 See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 204 (1964). The United States Supreme Court concluded that the need for counsel applied equally in an extra-judicial
setting as at the trial itself. See id.
52

53

See MOS8iah, 377 U.S. at 204.
See 377 U.S. 201 (1964).

54

See id. at 206. "We hold that the petitioner was denied the basic protections of
[the Sixth Amendment right to counsel] when there was used against him at his trial
evidence of his own incriminating words, which federal agents had deliberately elicited
form him after he had been indicted and in the absence of his counsel." See id. at 204.
The MOS8iah court explained that the adversarial system and that the Sixth Amendment contemplated a defendant aided trial by counsel. See id.
55

•

•

See id. at 202-203. Masslah and co-defendant Colson had been charged for a cocaine offense. MOS8iah, 377 U.S. at 202-203. Both were released on bail. See id. Colson later agreed to cooperate with the police. See id. Unbeknownst to Massiah, Mas. siah made incriminating statements to Colson. See id. Thus, the Sixth Amendment
prohibits government-initiated interrogation even if it is indirect and surreptitious.
See id.
56

See MOS8iah, 377 U.S. at 206-207. Massiah's Sixth Amendment right to counsel
attached when he was arraigned and subsequently indicted for possession of narcotics
aboard a United States vessel. See id. at 202. The United States Supreme Court reasoned that the police had deliberately elicited incriminating evidence through Colson
as the government's informant without the presence of counsel because Massiah had
no idea that he was under an interrogation by a government agent. See id. When the
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Consequently, the government may not deliberately elicit incriminating evidence from the accused without the presence
counsel for an offense to which the Sixth Amendment has already attached. 57
Moreover, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not
attach to other and different charges against the same defendant because the right to counsel is offense specific. 58 In
McNeil v. Wisconsin,59 the defendant, McNeil, admitted his
involvement in murder, attempted murder and armed burglary
charges to a sheriff after being formally charged with armed
robbery.60 The United States Supreme Court held that the government did not violate McNeil's Sixth Amendment right to
counsel. 61 Hence, once the Sixth Amendment right to counsel

government deliberately elected incriminating 8tatements from Massiah, it amounted
to a denial of the "basic protections" of the Sixth Amendment. See id. at 206.
57

See id. at 207. For criticisms of the reasoning behind the Massiah exclusionary
rule, Edwin Meese III, Promoting Truth in the Courtroom, 40 VAND. L. REV. 271,276281 (1987); H. Richard Uviller, Evidence from the Mind of the Criminal Suspect: A
Reconsideration of the Current Rules ofAccess and Restraint, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 1137,
1154-95 (1987).
58 See McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 175 (1991). See also Hoffa v. United
States, 385 U.S. 293, 308 (1966). Hoffa's Sixth Amendment right to counsel attached
concerning his prosecution for violation of the Taft-Hartley Act. See id. at 294. The
United States Supreme Court reasoned that Hoffa's statements related to the·commission of a separate offense, attempted bribery of jurors, which had no connection with
the legitimate defense of the Test Fleet prosecution. See id. 308. See also Dlinois v.
Perkins, 496 U.S. 292 (1990). Perkins had made incriminating statements of murder
to an undercover informant cellmate. See id. at 294. The United States Supreme Court
found no Sixth Amendment violation since Perkins had made incriminating statements voluntarily to an undercover cop regarding an uncharged offense. See id. at 299300. The United States Supreme Court further noted that the use of undercover
agents is a recognized law enforcement technique often employed in the prison context. See id. at 300.

59

See 501 U.S. 171 (1991).

See id. at 174. A public defender represented McNeil at a bail hearing for an
armed robbery charge in West Allis, Wisconsin. See id. at 173-174. While in jail on'
that charge, the police questioned McNeil about a murder charge in Caledonia, Wisconsin. See id. at 174. The police advised McNeil of his Miranda rights, McNeil signed
forms waiving them, and made statements incriminating himself in the Caledonia
offenses. See id. McNeil was then formally charged with the latter offense. See McNeil,
501 U.S. at 174.
60

61 See id. at 181-182. The United States Supreme Court reasoned that because
McNeil made statements with respect to the Caledonia offenses before the Sixth
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attaches to a specific offense, it cannot be invoked once for all
future prosecutions for it does not attach until a prosecution
has commenced. 62 Accordingly, the government does not violate
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel if evidence is obtained
without deliberate elicitation or through luck or happenstance
regarding an offense to which the Sixth Amendment has not
yet attached. 63 Thus, incriminating statements obtained by the
government pertaining to other crimes where the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel has not attached may be used in a
subsequent trial of those crimes. 64
B. EXCEPTIONS TO THE OFFENSE SPECIFIC RULE

Courts have developed two exceptions to the offense specific
requirement. 65 First, the offense specific requirement does not
apply when the subsequent uncharged offense is inextricably
66
intertwined with the charged offense. The exception focuses
on whether the facts underlying the charged and uncharged
offenses are identical. 67 Second, the offense specific require-

Amendment had been invoked, and therefore, no Sixth Amendment violation occurred
since the Sixth Amendment right to counsel had attached only to the armed robbery
offense. See id.
62

See id. at 175. And just as the right is offense specific, so also its Michigan v.
Jackson, 475 U.S. 625,636 (1986) effect of invalidating subsequent waivers in policeinitiated interviews is offense specific. See United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 188
(1984).
63

See Maine v. Moultan, 474 U.S. 159, 176 (1985). Deliberate elicitation occurs
when the government purposely seeks to obtain incriminating evidence from the accused, not when obtained by luck or happenstance. See id. The term interrogation
refers to any words or actions on the part of the police that the police should know are
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. See Spano v.
New York, 360 U.S. 315, 321-322 (1959).
64
~

66

.

See McNe,l, 501 U.S. at 174-175.

.

See supra notes 4-6 and accompanymg text.
See supra note 5 and accompanying text.

67

See Commonwealth v. Rainwater, 681 N.E. 2d 1218, 1224 n.5 (Mass. 1997). The
Rainwater court stated, "the more extensive line of cases focuses entirely on whether
the facts underlying the charged and uncharged offenses are either closely related or
inextricably intertwined." See id. at 1224. The Rainwater court noted that the inextricably intertwined exception is a narrow exception. See id. The Rainwater court relied
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ment does not apply when the government breaches its affirmative obligation not to circumvent the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel. 68 Courts construe this exception more broadly
than the inextricably intertwined exception where there is evidence that the police deliberately sought to circumvent the
69
prohibition of questioning in respect to the charged offense.
The circumvention of right exception allows for the suppression of incriminating evidence when the formal and subsequent charge arose from the same course of conduct. 70
1. Inextricably Intertwined Exception

The inextricably intertwined exception prohibits the government from initiating an interrogation with regard to the
uncharged offense if the formal charge and subsequent charge
are closely related. 71 The United States Supreme Court implicitly endorsed the inextricably intertwined exception in Brewer
v. Williams 72 and Maine v. Moulton. 73
In Brewer, the defendant, Robert Williams, abducted a tenyear-old girl after he escaped from a mental hospital in Iowa. 74
Williams' attorneys advised him not to say anything to the police without the presence of counsel. 75 The police officers agreed
not to interrogate Williams during a long automobile drive to

on Whittlesey v. State, 340 Md. 30, 53-54 (Md. 1996) in observing the development of
the two exceptions. See id. at 1224 n.5.
68
69
70

See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
See Rainwater, 681 N.E. 2d at 1223.

See United States v. Martinez, 972 F.2d 1100, 1105 (9th Cir. 1992); Rainwater,
681 N.E.2d at 1223-1224 n.5 (Mass. 1997); United States v. Mitcheltree, 940 F.2d
1329, 1342 (10th Cir. 1991); United States v. Melgar, 139 F.3d 1005, 1013-1014 (4th
Cir. 1998); Whittlesey v. State, 340 Md. 30, 53-54 (Md. 1995).
71
72
73
74

See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
See 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
See 474 U.S. 159 (1985).
See Brewer, 430 U.S. at 390.

75 See id. Williams called his attorney at Davenport who had advised Williams to
confess his murder in Davenport. See id. Thus, the police officers drove Williams from
Des Moines to Davenport where Williams' attorney advised William to turn himself ay
Davenport which was about 160 miles away. See id.
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76
Des Moines. Two officers drove Williams without the presence of counsel to Des Moines. 77 During the trip, one of the officers, who knew Williams was a former mental patient and
deeply religious, mentioned that the parents of the victim
should be entitled to a Christian burial. 7S A short time later,
still without the presence of counsel, Williams directed the officers to the location of the girl's body.79 The United States Supreme Court characterized the officer's action as purposely
isolating Williams from his lawyers to obtain as much incriminating information as possible. so As a result, the United States
Supreme Court held that the officer's actions clearly violated
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and suppressed William's statements concerning the murder charge. 81 Though the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel formally attached only to
the abduction charge, the United States Supreme Court extended the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to statements
relevant to the murder charge against Williams. 82
Similarly, in Maine v. Moulton the Court upheld the suppression of statements for two different charges. s3 In Moulton,
76

See id. at 391. A Des Moines lawyer had previously informed officers there that
he represented Williams. See Brewer, 430 U.S. at 390.

77 See id. at 391.
7S See id. at 392-393.
79 See id.

so

See id. at 399.

S1

See Brewer, 430 U.S. at 404. It should be noted, however, that these proceedings
concerned the abduction charge and not the later murder charge for which Williams
was convicted.
S2

See id. at 404-406. The United States Supreme Court held that the defendant's
wavier of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel was invalid and that the statements
he made to the police identifying the body's location were, therefore, inadmissible. See
id.
S3 See Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 180 (1985). The Moulton court explained
that a knowing exploitation by the State of an opportunity to confront the accused
without counsel being present is a breach of State's obligation not to circumvent the
right to the assistance of counsel as is the intentional creation of such an opportunity.
See id. at 176. Moulton court viewed the police recommendation of the use of body wire
to Colson as intentionally creating a situation that they knew, or should have known,
was likely to result in Moulton's making incriminating statements during his meeting
with Colson. See id. at 168.
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prosecutors indicted defendants Perley Moulton and Gary Col84
son on four counts of theft. Later, Colson confessed to his involvement in the thefts and agreed to cooperate with the police
in the prosecution of Moulton. 85 Though the police knew that
Moulton's right to counsel had attached to the theft charge, the
police still suggested that Colson wear a hidden wire transmitter and record a conversation between himself and Moulton. 86
The Court stated that the Sixth Amendment places an affirmative obligation upon the government not to act in a manner
that circumvents the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 87 Consequently, the Court concluded that the police violated Moulton's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 88 Therefore, the
United States Supreme Court suppressed Moulton's statements regarding the burglary but admitted evidence regarding
Moulton's alleged plan to kill a witness. 89 Thus, as Brewer and
Moulton demonstrate, the United States Supreme Court has
implied that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel may attach

84

See Moulton, 474 U.S. at 162-163. On April 7, 1981, a Waldo County grand jury
returned indictments charging Moulton and Colson with four counts of theft by receiving in violation of Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 17-A, § 359 (1983). See id. It should be
noted that Gary Colson, the co-defendant, has no relationship to Massiah's Colson.
85
See id. Colson gave full confessions of his participating with Moulton in committing the theft, and also admitted that he and Moulton broke into the local Ford dealership to steal the parts. See id. at 163. Colson also stated that he and Moulton had set
fire to the dump truck and had committed other thefts. See id. The police told Colson
that no additional charges would be brought against him in exchange for his help. See
Moulton, 474 U.S. at 163.
86

See id. at 163. The police argued that they had a legitimate purpose: to record
conversations regarding the killing of a witness. See id. at 178. In the process, the
police obtained incriminating evidence regarding Moulton's burglary charge. See id.
The United States Supreme Court did not find this persuasive in the wake of a knowing circumvention of Moulton's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. See id. at 179. The
United States Supreme Court reversed defendant's burglary conviction but allowed
the possibility that the information could be used in a subsequent trial regarding the
plan to kill the witness. See Moulton, 474 U.S. at 180. On the other hand, in a dissent
by Justice Burger, he found the result bizarre, stating that the mlijority's decision
turns the Sixth Amendment right to counsel into a magic cloak to protect criminals
who engage in multiple offenses that are the subject of separate police investigations.
See id. at 186.
87
88
89

See id.
See id. at 180.
See id.
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to other offenses that are closely related to the conduct that
formed the basis for the initially charged crime. 90
The inextricably intertwined exception to the offense specific requirement has been recognized since 1988 in People v.
Clankie. 91 Relying on two prior United States Supreme Court
decisions, the Clankie court concluded that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel that has attached to the formal charge
also extends to a subsequent charge that is closely related. 92
In Clankie, the government charged Thomas Clankie with
three separate counts of residential burglary.93 The Clankie
court suppressed incriminating evidence recorded via wiretap
because it violated Clankie's Sixth Amendment right to coun94
se1. The Clankie court determined that the inextricably intertwined exception applies when the two offenses are so similar
that the right to counsel for the first offense can trigger the
right to counsel for the subsequent offense. 95 The Clankie court
held that the three burglary offenses were closely related for
96
two reasons. First, both defendants testified to the same
course of conduct, the unlawful joint entry into the same victim's residence. 97 Second, the burglaries involved the same
house, same owner, and same time span. 98 Though the Clankie

90
91

See generally Moulton, 474 U.S. at 180.
See 530 N.E.2d 448 (Ill. 1988).
.

~

.

See id. at 450-452. The Clankie court relied on Brewer v. Williams and Maine v.
Moulton, in recognizing the inextricably intertwined exception. See id. The Clankie
court asserted that from these two Supreme Court cases, the United States Supreme
Court assumes that "the Sixth Amendment rights of one formany charged with an
offense extend to offenses closely related to that offense and for which a defendant is
subsequently formally accused." See id. at 452.
~.

.

See id. at 449. Clankie was charged by three separate counts of burglary under
Ill.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 38, par. 19--3) where the defendant entered the dwelling place of
J. F. McNeil. See Clankie, 530 N.E.2d at 449.

94

95
96
97
98

See id. at 453.
See id. at 452-453.
See at 452.
See id.
See Clankie, 530 N.E.2d at 452.
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court found that the charges were inextricably intertwined, it
did not attempt to delineate the parameters as to when the
inextricably intertwined exception applies. 99 After Clankie,
several federal circuit and state courts recognized the closely
related exception and attempted to define its specific requirelol
ments. 100 However, no uniform standard has been applied.
These courts have tried to cabin this unruly concept in one or
more of the following tests. 102
a. Same Course of Conduct
The Fifth and Sixth Circuits have held that the inextricably
intertwined exception applies if the charged and uncharged
offenses involve the same course of conduct. 103 In United States
v. Cooper,t°4 the Fifth Circuit first recognized the inextricably
intertwined exception under the "same course of conduct"
105
test. In Cooper, the prosecutors charged Clinton Cooper with
aggravated robbery.l06 Six days later, a federal agent visited

99 See id. The court acknowledged the closely related exception, but did not attempt
to define a standard because all the crimes concerned the same offense of burglary
that arose from the same course of conduct and factual predicate. See id.
100 See supra note 5 and accompanying text. While it might appear that the United
States Supreme Court's opinion in McNeil put an end to the inextricably intertwined
exception because McNeil was decided after Clankie, the Fifth Circuit in United States
v. Cooper acknowledged the same principle just six months after McNeil. See United
States v. Cooper, 949 F.2d 737, 743-744 (5th Cir. 1991).

101 See United States v. Nocella, 849 F.2d 33, 37-38 (lst Cir. 1988) (nulceii of operative fact); United States v. Kidd, 12 F.3d 30, 33-34 (4th Cir. 1993) (factual predicate
test); United States v. Hines, 963 F.2d 255, 257-258 (9th Cir. 1992) (time, place, persons); United States v. Cooper, 949 F.2d 737, 743-744 (5th Cir. 1991) (same course of
conduct); United States v. Mitcheltree, 940 F.2d 1329, 1342-1343 (lOth Cir. 1991)
(same evidence); United States v. Arnold, 106 F.3d 37-42 (3d Cir. 1997) (factual predicate, conduct, intent and circumstances).
102 See supra note 102 and accompanying text.

103 See United States v. Cooper, 949 F.2d 737, 743-744 (5th Cir. 1991); United
States v. Carpenter, 963 F.2d 736, 740-741 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v. Walker,
148 F.3d 518, 529 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v. Doherty, 126 F.3d 769, 776 n.32
(6th Cir. 1997).

104
105

See 949 F.2d 737 (5th Cir. 1991).
See id. at 743-744.

106 See id at 740. Cooper was a suspect in a convenience store robbery in Mart,
Texas. See id. The arresting officers conducted an inventory search of the car's con-
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Cooper in jail and interrogated him about possession of an unlicensed firearm during the robbery.107 The prosecutors used
information from the interrogation to subsequently charge
Cooper with unlawful possession of an unregistered firearm. lOS
The Fifth Circuit held that even though the two cases would
utilize essentially the same evidence, the robbery predated the
possession of a firearm, and therefore, the two charges were
not closely related. 109
The Fifth Circuit reaffirmed the "same course of conduct"
test later in United States v. Carpenter 110 and United States v.
Walker. lll In both cases, the court acknowledged the inextricably intertwined exception but found that the exception did not
appy.
1 112
In Carpenter, the officers arrested and charged James Carpenter with burglary.ll3 The officers discovered a firearm and
crack pipe on the back seat floorboard of the police cruiser
where Carpenter had been placed to be transported to the
114
county jail. While in custody, Carpenter confessed to Agent

tents before turning the car over to the wrecker for towing to the station. See id. In the
trunk they found a sawed-off shotgun. See Cooper, 949 F.2d at 740. The next day, the
state charged Cooper with aggravated robbery. See id.

107

See id.

lOS

See id. at 740-741. Cooper was convicted for the federal crime of unlawful possession of an unregistered firearm, in violation of 26 U.S.C §§ 5845(a), 5861(d), and
•
5871. See id. at 739.
109 See Cooper, 949 F.2d at 744. "Cooper's first claim, that his Sixth Amendment
right to counsel was violated when the federal agent question him about the robbery,
is captious at best." [d. at 743. This court applied the analysis from People v. Clankie
of whether or not two offenses were extremely closely related. See id. at 743-744.
110

III

See 963 F.2d 736 (5th Cir. 1992).
See 148 F.3d 518 (5th Cir. 1993).

112 See Carpenter, 963 F.2d at 740-741 (firearm offense was not inextricably intertwined with burglary offense because they arose out of a different course of conduct:
the burglary offense predated the firearm offense); Walker, 148 F.3d at 529-530
(knowingly making false material declarations in front of a federal grand jury not
inextricably intertwined with drug conspiracy because two offense involved different
conduct and sovereigns).
113
114

See Carpenter, 963 F.2d at 738.
See id.
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Redman that the gun and crack pipe belonged to him. 116 Subsequently, Carpenter was charged in federal court with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. 116 Applying the "same
course of conduct" analysis, the Fifth Circuit did not find that
the firearm charge was inextricably intertwined with the burglary offense because the burglary charge predated the firearm
offense. 117 Therefore, the Fifth Circuit did not suppress Carpenter's statements to Agent Redman. 11s
In Walker, the court again declined to apply the inextricably
intertwined exception based on the "same course of conduct"
test. 119 In Walker, Jerry Lee Quinn detected the surveillance
by Aberdeen Police Officer Pete Conwill and Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco and Firearms Agent Joey Hall, and fled. 120 The police
officers pursued a black and gold Pontiac Grand Am, which
they believed to be driven by Quinn. 121 Police Officer Conwill
attempted to apprehend the driver at an impromptu roadblock
and found the car empty.122 After impounding the Grand Am,
the police found a loaded 9mm semiautomatic handgun in the
backseat armrest. 123 Subsequently, the prosecutor charged

116 See id. Agent Redman with the Bureau of Alcohol Firearms and Tobacco visited
with Carpenter twice. See id. Redman received a report from the police department
which indicted that Carpenter qualified as an armed career criminal. See id. Redman
asked questioned solely about the firearm, advised Carpenter of his Miranda rights,
and obtained signed waiver of his Miranda rights. Carpenter, 963 F.2d at 738. Carpenter confessed that the gun and the crack pipe belonged to him. See id.
116

117

•

See id. at 739.
See id. at 741. "We do not find the firearm offense and the state burglary offense

to be 'inextricably intertwined' or 'extremely closely related"" [d. at 740-741. The warrant for the burglary charge came before the events leading up to the rll'earm charge.
See Carpenter, 963 F.2d at 741. Moreover, Carpenter does not even argue that the
firearm was in any way linked to the burglary. See id.
l1S

See id. at 741. The Fifth Circuit relied on its Circuit's prior holding in Cooper,
949 F.2d at 743-744 in finding that the inextricably intertwined exception applies if
both offenses arise from the same course of conduct. See id. at 739-740.
119

See Walker, 148 F.3d at 529-530.

120 See id. at 520.
121 See id .
122 See id.
123 See id .
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Quinn with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.

124

At

Quinn's firearms possession trial, Santonio Lamond Walker
testified that he, not Quinn, drove the car during the
125
pursuit.
After Quinn was convicted, Quinn volunteered information to his cellmate that he, rather than Walker, drove
126
the car.
The prosecutors subsequently charged Quinn with
suborning Walker to commit perjury.127 The Fifth Circuit found
no Sixth Amendment violation because the suborning charge
was not inextricably intertwined with the firearm charge. 128
The court reasoned that even though the same evidence was
admitted for the prosecution of both charges against Quinn,
the offenses were not inextricably intertwined because they
involved two distinct types of conduct. 129

acknowledged the "same course

30

United States v. Dohertl
131
of conduct" test.
In Doherty,

Similarly, the Sixth Circuit in

124

See Walker, 148 F.3d at 520.
125 See id
126
See id. at 521. Suspecting that Quinn had suborned Walker'8 perjury in the firearms possession trials, Police Officer Hall asked Quinn's cellmate, Rodney Seaton, to
be attuned to anything Quinn might say about his recent trial, but not to initiate any
conversation with Quinn. See id. Quinn volunteered to Seaton that he should not be in
jail because his "home boy" had "stood up in court and took the rap for him being in
the car." See id.
127
See Walker, 148 F.3d at 520. Quinn was indicted for suborning Walker via 18
U.S.C § 1622 and Walker was indicted for knowingly making false material declarations while under oath via 18 U.S.C. § 1623(a). See id. Walker sought to suppress his
statements made to his cellmate. See id.
128
See id. at 529-530. The court maintained that the United States Supreme Court
in Moulton, 474 U.S. at 179-180, identified the correct standard as whether the conduct leading to each offense is the same. See id. at 529. The court relied on Kuhlmann
I). Wilson, 477 U.S. 436 ·(1986), which held that no Sixth Amendment violation occurs
where the defendant's statement to the informant were volunteered and the volunteering of the information was precipitated by events beyond the informant's control,
in finding that no Sixth violation occurred when Quinn had volunteered incriminating
statements to the informant. See Walker, 148 F.3d at 528-529.
129 See id. at 529-530. The court further stated that the distinctly separate offense
of firearms possession and subornation of perjury did not occur within a close temporal
proximity. See id. at 529.
130

•

See 126 F.3d 769 (6th Clr. 1997).

131 See id. at 776. The Sixth Circuit acknowledged that the question of how inextricably intertwined two offenses must be so that the right to counsel attaches simulta-
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a Native American Tribal Court convicted Ross Allen Doherty
of sexually abusing two children. 132 Subsequently, the FBI
agents questioned Doherty regarding federal charges of
knowingly engaging in a sexual act with a child. 133 Doherty
134
confessed to committing the sexual offenses. Because the
same underlying conduct formed the basis for both offenses,
the Sixth Circuit held that the right to counsel would have attached to both charges. 135 However, the tribal arraignment did
not invoke the Sixth Amendment right to counsel because the
right to counsel is created by the United States Constitution
which does not apply to American Indian tribal criminal proceedings. 136 Thus, the Sixth Circuit acknowledged the inextricably intertwined exception but rejected its application because
the first legal proceeding was an Indian tribal proceeding. 137
b. Same Evidence Test
Other courts have applied the inextricably intertwined exception when two offenses involved the same evidence. 138 For
example, in United States v. Mitcheltree/ 39 the Tenth Circuit
applied the "same evidence" test to determine if the charged
neously with respect to both offenses is open to some doubt and left. the consideration
of that question for another day. See id.
132

See id. at 772. The Hannaville Indian Community Tribal Court charged Doherty
with statutory rape. See id. The molested children were Doherty's two stepdaughters.
See Doherty, 126 F.3d at 772.
133

.

See ,d at 772-773.

134

See id. Doherty was convicted of knowingly engaging in a sexual act with a child
via 18 U.S.C. § 2243(a) (1994), applicable to Native American reservations through 18
U.S.C § 1153(a). See id.
135

See id. at 776.

136

See Doherty, 126 F.3d at 777. The Sixth Circuit relied on Talton v. Mayes, 163
U.S. 376, 383-384 (1896) in holding that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel does
not apply to Indian tribes. See id. The court reasoned that, since the Indian tribes are
distinct, independent political communities, retaining their original rights, the Sixth
Amendment right did not apply to Indian tribes. See id.
137

See id.

See generally United States v. Mitcheltree, 940 F.2d 1329, 1334 (10th Cir. 1991);
Whittlesey v. Maryland, 665 A.2d 223, 235-236 (Md. 1995); Commonwealth v. Rainwater, 681 N.E.2d 1218, 1223-1224 n.5 (Mass. 1997).
139 See United States v. Mitcheltree, 940 F.2d 1329 (10th Cir. 1991).
138
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MDMA counts and the uncharged witness tampering count
were inextricably intertwined. 140 Rizzo, a friend of Mitcheltree,
cooperated with the police by secretly taping her conversation
with Mitcheltree. 141 During the conversation, Rizzo encouraged
Mitcheltree to talk about the pending MDMA offense as well
142
as the witness tampering offense. Mitcheltree made incriminating statements concerning both offenses. 143 The Tenth Circuit found that the police obtained incriminating statements
relating directly to both the MDMA and witness tampering
offenses, because both offenses involved the same evidence. 144
Therefore, because the two crimes involved the same evidence
in regards to proof of both the MDMA counts and witness tampering, the Tenth Circuit held that the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel attached to both offenses. 145
Likewise, the Court of Appeals of Maryland in Whittlesey v.
Maryland 146 applied the "same evidence" test to determine if
147
the two offenses are inextricably intertwined. In Whittlesey,
Mike Whittlesey asked David Strathy, Whittlesey's friend, to
meet him at Gunpowder Falls State Park and help him dig up

140 See id. at 1344-1345. Mitcheltree was charged with the distribution of the drug
methylendioxymethamphetamine or MDMA. See id. at 1332. MDMA is a designer
drug sometimes known as ecstasy, which did not become subject to federal controlled
substance penalties until October 27, 1986. See id. at 1335. She was later convicted for
introducing a misbranded drug into interstate commerce with the intent to mislead or
defraud, 21 U.S.C §§ 331(a) & 333(a)(2); conspiracy to commit this offense, 18 U.S.C §
37; and witness tampering, 18 U.S.C. § 1512(bX3). See id.
141 See Mitcheltree, 940 F.2d at 1340. According to Rizzo her purpose was to see if
the defendant was going to try to change her testimony. See id.
142 See id. at 1337-1338.
143 See id. The transcript of the conversation contains many personal details about
Mitcheltree that one might reveal to a close friend. Rizzo sought Mitcheltree's advice
as to what she should say and do in connection with the investigation. See id.
144 See Mitcheltree, 940 F.2d at 1344-1345. MDMA 0 fliense mvo
.
Ive d t h e same eVI.

dence for the witness tampering evidence, therefore, the two offenses are closely related in time and subject matter. See id.
145 S
ee id.
146
147

See 665 A.2d 223 (Md. 1995).
See id. at 235-236.
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some gold and silver. 148 Once Strathy arrived at the park, Strathy learned that Whittlesey really wanted to bury a dead
body. 149 Strathy immediately left the scene and made an
160
anonymous report to the police. Separate from the anonymous report, the police visited Strathy and Strathy reported
incident involving the body in the woods. 161 The police enlisted
Strathy to arrange meetings with Whittlesey to try to elicit
information about Griffin's disappearance. 162 Strathy cooperated with the police and recorded a conversation between himself and Whittlesey through a body wire. 163 The body wire enabled the police to record several conversations in which Whittlesey made numerous incriminating statements. 164 The police
used this evidence to support charges against Whittlesey for
allegedly making false statements to the police. 166 Later, Whittlesey was convicted for murdering Griffin. 166 The court determined that the false statements charge could have been supported by evidence that Whittlesey told the police inconsistent
stories in his two meetings with the police, without regard to
which story was true. 167 Furthermore, the State could have
disproved many of Whittlesey's statements to the police, such
as his claim to have gone to Washington with Griffin, without
having to show that Whittlesey had killed Griffin.168 In addition, the court reasoned that committing murder is separate
from an attempt to avoid responsibility for it. 169 Consequently,

148

See id. at 228.

149 See id.
160

161

See id. at 228-229.

See Whittlesey, 665 A.2d at 228-229.
162 See id. at 229.
163
See,'d.

164

.

See id. at 229. The Strathy conversations included a detailed description of how
Whittlesey buried Griffin's body. See id.

166 See Whittlesey, 665 A.2d at 232.

156

See id. at 229.

157 See id. at 236.
158 See,'d.
159 S ee,'d.
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the Whittlesey court found that the two charges were not inextricably intertwined under the "same evidence" test because
the proof elements for the two charges did not necessarily require identical evidence. 160
In addition, the Court of Appeals of Maryland in Whittlesey
161
v. Maryland observed that some courts require that time,
place and persons be the same to determine whether the facts
underlying the charge and uncharged offenses are inextricably
intertwined. 162 In Whittlesey, the court concluded that the false
statements charge and the murder charge were not inextricably intertwined under the "time, place and persons" test, because the false statements occurred days after the murder in
another location. l63 Therefore, the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel did not cover both the false statement and murder offenses. l64
c. Time, Place, and Persons Test
The Ninth Circuit suggested that the inextricably intertwined exception applies if the charged and the uncharged offenses involve the same time, place, and persons. 165 In United
States v. Hines,166 the Ninth Circuit declined to apply the inex160

.

See Whittlesey, 665 A.2d at 236. The court relied on United States v. Williams,
993 F.2d 451 (5th Cir. 1993) and Hendricks v. Vasquez, 974 F.2d 1099, 1104-1105 (9th
Cir. 1992) where the Fifth and Ninth Circuit courts respectively held that the inextricably intertwined exception did not apply because the two offenses had totally independent elements, and the two crimes occurred at a different time and location. See id.
at 235-236.
161

See Whittlesey v. Maryland, 665 A.2d 223 (1995).

162

See id. 234-236. The court reviewed many prior cases which have attempted to
define what is required to fall under the inextricably intertwined exception. See id. For
example, the court observed that the Ninth Circuit in Hines, 963 F.2d at 257-258, and
Hendricks, 974 F.2d at 1104-1105 have looked for identity of time, place, and conduct
to determine whether the same acts underlie both charges. See id. at 235-236.
163
164

See Whittlesey, 665 A.2d at 236.
See id.

165

See Hendricks v. Vasquez, 974 F.2d 1099, 1104-1105 (9th Cir. 1992); United
States v. Hines, 963 F.2d 255, 257-258 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v. Martinez, 972
F.2d 1100, 1104 (9th Cir. 1992).
166

See 963 F.2d 255 (9th Cir. 1992).
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tricably intertwined exception because the defendant's firearm
crimes occurred in two separate months. 167 Although the formal and subsequent charges involved the identical firearm offense, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the time, place, and
persons differed. 168
In United States v. Martinez,169 the Ninth Circuit again refused
to apply the inextricably intertwined exception for similar
firearm offenses. 17o Martinez was arrested and charged with
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, theft of a firearm,
and possession of a controlled substance. 171 However, the state
172
charges were dismissed. Federal agents then questioned
Martinez regarding the federal offense of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. 173 During the interrogation, Martinez
admitted that he had knowingly purchased the handgun. 174 On
the same day, Martinez made his first appearance in federal
court and counsel was appointed. 175 The Ninth Circuit stated
that it would not extend the inextricably intertwined exception
after dismissal of the initial charge,176 reasoning that such a
"broad prophylactic rule" ran counter to the established Sixth

167 See id. at 257-258. At the time where agent questioned Hines about January
1989 activities, Hines had been provided counl!el for state prosecution activities in
December 1988. See id.
168 See,'d.
169 See 972 F.2d 1100 (9th Cir. 1992).
170 See generally ,d.
. at 1103-1105.
171

See id. 1101.

172 See id. at 1102.
173 See id. The federal

agents advised Martinez of his Miranda rights, which he
waived. See Martinez, 972 F.2d at 1102.

174 See id. Martinez executed an affidavit admitting that he had knowingly purchased the handgun. See id.
175 See,'d.
176 See id. at 1104. First, the Ninth Circuit observed that the two firearm offenses
arose from the same conduct. See Martinez, 972 F.2d at 1104. Second, the Ninth Circuit declined to extend the inextricably intertwined indefinitely for it would improperly require suppression of a statement given to federal authorities regarding a federal
crime, if unbeknown to the federal agents, the suspect had been charged for the same
substantive act at some earlier time. See id. at 1104-1105.
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Amendment right to counsel jurisprudence. Therefore, in
order satisfy the "time, place and persons test," the defendant
must not only show that the time, place, and persons were
identical in both offenses, the defendant must also have a
charge pending to which the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
attaches before the court will extend that protection to a sub178
sequent 0 fliense ..
d. Factual Predicate Test
The Third and Fourth Circuits provide that the inextricably
intertwined exception applies when the factual predicate of
each offense are identical. 179 In United States v. Arnold,180 the
Third Circuit held that the right to counsel may carry over
from the pending charge to a new charge if the new charge
arose from the same acts and factual predicate on which the
pending charges were based. 181 In Arnold, Dean Arnold stole
money and told his then fiancee, Jennifer Kloss, about the
theft. 182 Fearing that Kloss would tell the FBI about his
crimes, Arnold told several people including Alex Introcaso, a
private investigator, that he would pay $20,000.00 to kill
183
Kloss. Introcaso contacted the FBI and reported Arnold's of-

177 See id. at 1104-1105. The Ninth Circuit observed that the United States Supreme Court in Maine v. Moulton and McNeil v. Wisconsin stressed the narrow application of the Sixth Amendment and also recognized the importance of alloWing the
police to initiate and pursue investigations of new or additional crimes. See Martinez,
972 F.2d at 1104-1105. See also Hendricks, 974 F.2d at 1104, where the Ninth Circuit
again rejected the application of the inextricably intertwined exception. See id. at
1104-1105. The court noted that this exception is a "limited exception." See id.
178 See Hines, 963 F.2d at 257-258; Martinez, 972 F.2d at 1104-1105.

179 See

United States v. Kidd, 12 F.3d 30, 33-34 (4th Cir. 1993); United States v.
Arnold, 106 F.3d 37, 41-42 (3d Cir. 1997).
180 See 106 F.3d 37 (3rd Cir. 1997).

181 See id. at 41-42. "We adopt the 'closely related' exception and hold that it applies here." See id. at 42. The Third Circuit relied on Whittlesey v. Maryland, 665 A2d
223 (Md. 1995) in determining whether the same acts and factual predicates underlie
both charges. See id. at 41. The Third Circuit observed that courts have looked for
similarities of time, place, person and conduct. See id.
182

See Arnold, 106 F.3d at 38.

183 See id. at 39. Introcaso suspected that Arnold had committed the federal Armored Express thefts and contacted the police to obtain a reward. See id.
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fer to have Kloss killed. l84 The prosecutor obtained a sealed
indictment against Arnold charging him with bank theft,
money laundering and witness intimidation. 185 That afternoon,
Arnold stated his threat to kill Kloss to an undercover officer
posing as a professional hit man. 18s Subsequently, the government indicted Arnold with attempted murder of a witness. 187
Arnold sought to suppress his conversation with the undercover officer. 188 The court agreed and adopted the "factual
predicate" test, finding that the central purpose and the in189
tended results of both offenses were the same. Therefore, the
Third Circuit held that both offenses arose from the same
predicate facts, conduct, intent and circumstances, and consequently, concluded that the inextricably intertwined exception
· d.190
app1Ie
Similarly, in United States v. Kidd/ 91 the Fourth Circuit
held that the uncharged offense must derive from the same
factual predicate as the charged offense in order to fall within
the closely related exception. 192 In Kidd, the government in-

184 See id. The FBI recorded a meeting between Introcaso and Arnold where Introcaso told Arnold that he had located a hit man willing to kill Kloss for $20,000.00. See
id.

185

. •

See Arnold, 106 F.3d at 39. The Witness charge specifically alleged that Arnold
had threatened to kill Kloss if she provided information to law enforcement officers
about the thefts. See id.
186

See id.

187

See id. The tape recording Arnold's interest in killing Kloss was the only evidence the government submitted with respect to the attempted murder charge. See id.
188

See Arnold, 106 F.3d at 39.

189 See

id. at 41-42.

190 See id. The Third Circuit observed that both offenses involved the same witness,
were related in time, and had the same motive. See id.
191 See 12F.3d 30 (4th Cir. 1993).
192 See id. at 33. This court held that although the uncharged crime involved the
same type of crime as the charged offense, it involved a different purchaser-informant,
occurred at a different time, and took place in a different location. See id. The Fourth
Circuit further asserted that the Sixth Amendment does not create a sanctuary for the
commission of additional crimes during the pendency of an indictment. See id. Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit held that even if time, place, persons all are the same as
to both offenses, a defendant must also demonstrate that the interrogation on the new
offenses produced incriminating evidence as to the previously charged offense. See
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dicted Norman Kidd on six drug charges after government informants tape-recorded approximately seven of Kidd's sales of
cocaine base, also known as crack. 193 On July 3, 1992, government officials arrested Kidd and appointed counsel for him. 194
On August 26, an undercover informant who had no prior contact with Kidd made a tape-recorded crack purchase from
Kidd. 195 The court concluded that the August 26 sale was factually distinct from and independent of the prior offenses for
which the Sixth Amendment right had been invoked. 196 Therefore, the charge of selling cocaine did not relate to the earlier
charges for which Kidd had been indicted. 197 The court stated
that even if the court applied the "same course of conduct" test,
Kidd would still be convicted of a superseding charge of conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute cocaine and cocaine possession and distribution. 198 Thus, the court focused on
the factual predicate of the underlying offenses rather than
evaluating whether the two offenses involved the same course
of conduct. 199 As a result, the Fourth Circuit acknowledged the

United States v. Melgar, 139 F.3d 1005, 1014-1015 (4th Cir. 1998). The Fourth Circuit
reasoned that the inextricably intertwined exception must be crafted to avoid hampering legitimate, necessary law enforcement investigations. See id.
193 See Kidd, 12 F.3d at 31. Kidd was charged with five counts of cocaine possession
and distribution under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) and one count of conspiracy to possess with
intent to distribute cocaine base per 21 U.S.C. § 846. See id.
194

195
196

See id. Counsel was appointed three days after Kidd's arrest. See id.
See id. at 31-32.
See Kidd, 12 F.3d at 33-34.

See id. The later drug investigation concerned only new criminal activity. See id.
The court suggested that a Sixth Amendment violation would have resulted if the sale
had involved the same time, place, and persons. See id.
198 See id. at 34. The defendant argued that both drug transactions were identical,
and therefore, arose from the same course of conduct. See Kidd, 12 F.3d at 34. The
court disagreed, stating that even if the court applied the same course of conduct, the
facts underlying the offenses is still controlling. See id.
199 See id. at 34. This court held that the same course of conduct is more semantic
than real and is controlled by factual and temporal relationships among the offenses.
See id. The court explained that the mere fact that both the pending offense and new
offense involved drug distribution does not mean the right to counsel attached to both.
See id. To hold otherwise would essentially permit charged suspects to commit similar
crimes with impunity. See Kidd, 12 F.3d at 33.
197
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inextricably intertwined
· t'Ion. 200
app1lca

exception,

yet

rejected

its

e. Nucleii of Operative Fact Test
The First Circuit, in United States v. Nocella,201 suggested
that the inextricably intertwined exception applied when the
charged offense and the subsequent offense arose out a common nucleii of operative fact. 202 In Nocella, after the state
charged Robert Nocella with possession of marijuana, an informant recorded an order of cocaine from Nocella. 203 Nocella
alleged that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel attached to
the subsequent cocaine charges, and therefore, should be suppressed. 204 The First Circuit disagreed, stating that the purpose of the continuing investigation against Nocella was not to
be used to unearth incriminating evidence for the marijuana
charge, but for the new drug offense. 205 Thus, the government
acted in an investigatory, not accusatory, manner with regard
206
to the cocaine offense. The First Circuit concluded that the
marijuana and cocaine charges arose out of a different nucleii
of operative fact, because the possession of marijuana and cocaine offenses necessitated proof of disparate elements and

200

See id. at 34. In rejecting Kidd's right to counsel claim, the Fourth Circuit reasoned that "[t]he Sixth Amendment does not create a sanctuary for the commission of
additional crimes during the pendency of an indictment and to exclude such evidence
would unnecessarily frustrate the public's interest in the investigation of criminal
activities." See id. at 33 (citing Maine u. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 180 (1985).
201 See 849 F.2d 33 (1st Cir. 1988).
202
203

204
205

See id. at 38.
See id. at 34-35.
See id. at 35.
See id. at 37-38.

206 See Nocella, 849 F.2d at 38. The First Circuit held that the Sixth Amendment
right had not attached to the cocaine offense. See id. Therefore, when the government
had investigated charges to the new offense, it was investigatory not accusatory. See
id.
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207

occurred at different times. Thus, the First Circuit rejected
the application of the inextricably intertwined exception. 20s
In Taylor v. Florida,209 the court again focused on the underlying facts of both offenses in order to determine whether
the inextricably intertwined exception applied. 210 In Taylor,
Dennis J. Taylor had been arrested and charged with dealing
in stolen property.211 Later, Detective Graham interrogated
Taylor, regarding a burglary offense. 212 The court suppressed
Taylor's incriminating statements regarding the burglary offense based on the inextricably intertwined exception. 213 The
court observed that the two offenses involved the same physical evidence, acts and factual predicates. 214 Moreover, Taylor's
.knowledge that the jewelry had been stolen was a crucial element of the dealing in dealing in stolen property offense. 216
Therefore, the court found that both offenses arose from the
same facts and circumstances because the offense of dealing in

207 See ill. at 38. The First Circuit explained the state and federal offenses were
"scissile'" rather than inextricably intertwined. See ill. To ignore the separateness
-would "needlessly frustrate the public's interest in investigation of criminal activities."
See Nocella, 849 F.2d at 38. The court asserted that the Sixth Amendment's intended
·function is not to wrap a protective cloak around the defendant. See ill. at 38.
20S ' ill
See .

209

210

726 So. 2d 841(1st Cir. 1999).

See ill. at 845.

See ill. at 842. A burglary investigation by Detective Graham revealed that four
pieces of jewelry belonging to Curry were pawned in the name of Taylor and thumbprint were found on the pawn ticket for these items. See id.
212 See ill. at 842-843. Detective Graham asked Taylor if he had anything to do with
the burglary of the Curry residence, because Detective Graham was interested in
where the stolen property initially came from. See Taylor, 726 So. at 843. The State
did not prosecute the burglary charge. See id.
211

213

See id. at 846.

214

See ill. Furthermore, the First Circuit stated that the similarities of time, place,
person and conduct of both offense were striking. See ill.
216 See Taylor, 726 So. at 846. "Here, the inquiry concerning the burglary sought information from Taylor concerning the loss of the very same jewelry that formed the
basis of the offense for which had been charged." [d.
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stolen property involved the act of obtaining and using prop216
erty belonging to the burglary victim.
2. Circumvention of the Sixth Amendment Right Exception

Although the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Covarrubias
only addressed the inextricably intertwined exception, this
217
Note briefly discusses the circumvention of right exception.
As previously mentioned, the United States Supreme Court in
Maine v. Moulton ruled that law enforcement has an affirmative obligation to act in a manner that does not circumvent,
and thereby, dilute the protection afforded by the Sixth
218
Amendment right to counsel. Accordingly, several courts
have construed the circumvention of right exception more
broadly than the inextricably intertwined exception where evidence indicates that the police deliberately circumvented the
219
prohibition of questioning in respect to the charged offense.
In United States v. Martinez,22o the Ninth Circuit offered
several factors for determining whether the circumvention of
221
right exception applies. For example, the Ninth Circuit will
consider: first, the degree of federal participation in the state's
decision to dismiss state charges; second, the degree of state
participation in its decision to interrogate and charge the de-

216

See id.

217.

•

.

See Umted States v. Covarrubias, 179 F.3d 1219, 1226 (9th Clr. 1999). "Because
our holding that the offenses were 'inextricably intertwined' or 'closely related' provides a sufficient basis to affirm the district court's suppression order, we do not consider whether the district judge was also correct in holding the 'circumvention of Sixth
Amendment right' exception applicable as well." [d.
218

See Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 171 (985).

219

See Commonwealth v. Rainwater, 681 N.E.2d 1218, 1223-1224 n.5 (Mass. 1997);
Whittlesey v. Maryland, 665 A.2d 223, 235 (Md. 1995). See also generally United
States v. Mitcheltree, 940 F.2d 1329, 1342-43 OOth Cir. 1991); United States v.
Martinez, 972 F.2d 1100, 1104-1105 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v. Rodriguez, 931 F.
Supp. 907, 926-927 (D. Mass. 1996); United States v. Melgar, 139 F.3d 1005, 10131015 (4th Cir. 1998).
220
221

See, 972 F.2d 1100 (9th Cir. 1992).
.

See id. at 1106.
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fendant; three, the degree of joint decision-making over the
222
forum in which the defendant should be prosecuted.
Furthermore, the Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Terzado-Madruga 223 held that the government violates the Sixth
Amendment whenever a government informant actively engages a defendant in a conversation that is likely to elicit incriminating statements about the defendant's upcoming
tria1. 224 By obtaining information through an undercover informant, the police deny the defendant the right to rely on
counsel as the medium between the accused and the government. 225 Therefore, when the government uses an -agent such
as an informant to actively initiate a conversation that is likely
to elicit incriminating evidence to which the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel has attached, the government has circumvented the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 226
Likewise, in United States v. Mitcheltree,227 discussed infra,
the court suppressed a taped conversation based on the circumvention of right exception. 228 When there is a deliberate
Sixth Amendment violation, the government may not use the
defendant's uncounseled incriminating statements of those or
229
very closely related subsequent charges at tria1. Mitcheltree's hairdresser, Rizzo, cooperated with the police by agreeing to ask broad questions to Mitcheltree about the subject
matter of the charged offense. 230 These open-ended questions
made it virtually certain that the defendant would discuss the

222

.

See id. The Ninth Circuit stated that the key factor is the extent of coordination
between state and federal authorities. See id.
223
224
225
226

. 227
228
229

See United States v. Terzado-Madruga, 897 F.2d 1099 (11th Cir. 1990).
See id. at 1110.
See id. at 1109-1110.
See id.
See 940 F.2d 1329 (lOth Cir. 1991).
See id. at 1341.
See id. at 1341-1342.

230 See Mitcheltree, 940 F.2d at 1337-1338. The defendant's attorney specifically advised her not to talk to anybody that might be a potential witness. See id. at 1336.
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details of the pending MDMA counts. 231 The Tenth Circuit
characterized the behavior by the police as circumventing
232
Mitcheltree's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Hence, the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel covered both the charged
and uncharged offenses. 233

IV. THE NINTH CIRCUITS ANALYSIS
In United States v. Covarrubias,234 the Ninth Circuit considered whether questioning of Covarrubias and Ochoa by I.N.S.
Agent Gonzalez violated their Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 235 The Ninth Circuit evaluated the government's appeal in
light of Sixth Amendment jurisprudence and decided that the
government had violated the defendant s' Sixth Amendment
right to counsel. 236
A. THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL ATTACHED TO THE STATE
KIDNAPPING CHARGE

In determining whether or not the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel attached to the defendants' state kidnapping

231

See id. at 1340. Because the informant asked such broad questions to cover the
pending charge although aimed at another uncharged offense, it was a knowing circumvention of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. See id. at 1340-1341. At least
seven times, Rizzo sought the defendant's advice as to what she should say and do in
connection with the investigation. See id. at 1340. Rizzo also asked about defendant's
testimony and her knowledge of the conspiracy. See Mitcheltree, 940 F.2d at 1340.
232 See id. The Tenth Circuit found that Rizzo was more than a passive listener; she
exercised skill at leading the conversation into particular topics and prompting particular replies. See id. The Tenth Circuit stated, "[I]n an effort to lead the defendant
into witness tampering, Rizzo inquired into the pending charges in more than a tangential way, and violated the defendant's sixth amendment rights on the pending
MDMA charges." See id. Furthermore, the court found that the prosecutor took no
steps to insure that the informant did not communicate with the defendant about the
pending charges and consequently the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel
was compromised. See id. n.13.
233 See Mitcheltree, 940 F.2d at 1344-1345.
234

235

See 179 F.3d 1219 (9th Cir. 1999).
See generally id.

236 See I'd•
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charge,237 the Ninth Circuit stated that the right to counsel
attaches once the prosecution has initiated adversary judicial
proceedings against the defendant(s).238 Therefore, the right to
counsel had attached to the state crime of kidnapping when
the defendants were arraigned and appointed counsel. 239
The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel is offense specific,240 which prohibits government initiated interrogation regarding only the offense to
which the right to counsel has attached. 241 Thus, the Sixth
Amendment prohibited government initiated interrogation
only concerning the state kidnapping charge. 242 Neverthele,ss,
the Ninth Circuit explained that appellate courts, in applying
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, have recognized two
clear exceptions to this offense specific requirement: the inextricably intertwined and the circumvention of the Sixth
243
Amendment right exception. Since the court held that the
right to counsel attached to the state kidnapping charge, the
court went on to discuss whether the right to counsel also attached to the subsequent charge of transporting illegal
aliens. 244

237 See id at 1223.
238 See id. The United States Supreme Court stated that adversarial judicial proceedings are initiated only when the government has committed itself to prosecute.
See United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 187-188 (1984).

2See3
9.
.
.
Covarrublas, 179 F.3d at 1223. Arraignment and appomtment of counsel at

the preliminary hearing are adversarial judicial proceeding. See also Kirby v. Dlinois,
406 U.S. 682,687-688 (1972) (the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches only at
or immediately after the initiation of an adversarial judicial proceeding whether by
way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information or arraignment).

240

See Covarrubias, 179 F.3d at 1223. See also supra note 2 and accompanying ,
text (discussing the offense specific requirement).

241 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
242

See Covarrubias, 179 F.3d at 1223.

243 See id.
244 See id.
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B. APPLICATION OF THE INEXTRICABLY INTERTWINED
EXCEPTION

The inextricably intertwined exception provides that when
the pending charge is so closely related with the charge under
investigation, the right to counsel attaches to both charges,
even if the government has not formally initiated an adversarial judicial proceeding on the pending charge. 245 In its discussion of the inextricably intertwined exception, the Ninth
Circuit relied on decisions from both the United States Supreme Court and other Circuits. 246
The Ninth Circuit conceded that the United States Supreme
Court had not expressly adopted the inextricably intertwined
exception.247 However, the court stressed that the United
States Supreme Court implicitly endorsed the inextricably intertwined exception in Brewer v. Williams 248 and Maine v.
111
1ton. 249
lV.l.ou
In Brewer, the United States Supreme Court suppressed
statements made by the defendant regarding the murder
charge even though the right to counsel attached only for the
abduction charge. 25o Based on Brewer, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that the United States Supreme Court "treated the right
as if it also applied to the murder charges involving the same
. 'dent and'
InCl
VICt'1m. ,,251
In Moulton, the United States Supreme Court expressed
the same principle. 252 In Moulton, although the right to counsel
245
246
247

S ee id.
See Covarrubias, 179 F.3d at 1224.
See id. at 1224.

248

See generally 430 U.S. 387 (1977) (suppressing incriminating statements for defendant's murder trial although formally charged with abduction).
249
See generally 474 U.S. 159 (1985) (suppressing incriminating statements for
burglary although formally charged with theft).
250
251
252

See Brewer, 430 U.S. at 404-406.
See Covarrubias, 179 F.3d. at 1224.
See Moulton, 474 U.S. at 180.
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attached to only a theft charge, the United States Supreme
Court suppressed statements regarding a subsequent burglary
charge because the police breached their affirmative obligation
253
to honor the Sixth Amendment right to counse1.
Analyzing the two United States Supreme Court decisions
in Brewer and Moulton, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the
right to counsel may attach to separate offenses as long as the
court finds a close factual relationship between them. 254 Thus,
the Ninth Circuit in Covarrubias court recognized the inextricably intertwined exception to the offense specific
.
t 255
.
reqwremen.
As the United States Supreme Court has not delineated the
parameters of the inextricably intertwined exception, the
Ninth Circuit also relied on the decisions of other federal circuits, including its own, that have previously applied the inextricably intertwined exception. 256 The court began with the first
case in which it acknowledged the inextricably intertwined
. 257
except Ion.

In United States v. Hines,258 the Ninth Circuit held that if
time, place, and persons differed even for the same offense, the
inextricably intertwined exception does not apply.259 Later, in

253

See id. The Court found that the state breached its affirmative obligation not to
circumvent the right to assistance of counsel. See id.

254 See Covarrubias,

179 F.3d at 1224. The Covarrubias court believed that every
circuit court that has considered or adopted the inextricably intertwined exception has
uniformly read Brewer v. Williams and Maine v. Moulton in the same manner. See id.
at 1223. "On the basis of a uniform reading of the two United States Supreme Court
cases, every circuit to consider the question, including our own, has recognized an
exception to the offense-specific requirement of the Sixth Amendment. " [d.

255 See id. at 1224.
256
See Covarrubias, 179 F.3d at 1224-1225.
257 See id.
258
See 963 F.2d at 255.
259 See id. The Ninth Circuit decided that the inextricably intertwined exception did

not apply because the place, time, and persons involved were all different. See id.
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United States v. Martinez, the Ninth Circuit declined to apply
the exception when the state charge had been dismissed. 260

Aware that no single test determines when the inextricably
intertwined exception applies, the Ninth Circuit looked to the
261
other circuits for guidance. For example, the court discussed
United States v. Arnold,262 in which the Third Circuit utilized
263
the "factual predicate" test.
In Arnold, the Third Circuit
held that the inextricably intertwined exception will apply if
the two offenses arose from the same predicate facts, intent,
circumstances and conduct. 264 Conversely, if the factual predicate differed, then the inextricably intertwined exception
would not apply.266
Finally, the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court's reasons for applying the inextricably intertwined exception. 266 The
district court held that the state kidnapping charges and federal charges for transportation of an illegal alien were inextri-

260 See United States v.

Martinez, 972 F.2d 1100, 1104 (9th Cir. 1992). The Ninth
Circuit denied the application of the inextricably intertwined exception due to their
reluctance to extend the doctrine indefinitely into the future after the initial charge
was dismissed. See id. The Ninth Circuit held that the reasoning of Maine and Moulton, which stressed both the narrow application of the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel and the importance of allowing police to initiate and pursue investigations.
See id. at 1104-1105.

261

See Covarrubias, 179 F.3d at 1225-1226. The Ninth Circuit stated that the
Ninth Circuit in Hines failed to identify the specific factors for when the inextricably
intertwined exception applies. See id. at 1224 (citing Hines, 963 F.2d at 257-258).

262 See Uruted
. States v. Arnold, 106 F.3d 37 (3rd Cir. 1997).
263
264

See id. at 42.

266

See Covarrubias, 179 F.3d at 1225 n.7.

See id. at 41-42. The Third Circuit found that the inextricably intertwined exception applied for witness intimidation and attempted murder because the intended
victim of both crimes was the same, the offenses arose from the same facts and circumstances, the conduct was closely related in time, and the two acts were in furtherance of the same purpose. See id.
266 See United States v. Kidd, 12 F.3d 30, 33-34 (4th Cir. 1993). The Fourth Circuit
held that the cocaine distribution conspiracy, which ended in May 1992, was not inextricably intertwined with a subsequent sale in August of 1992. See id. The Fourth
Circuit came to this conclusion because the individuals involved, the time, and location of the offenses were all different. See id.
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267
cably intertwined based on the "same course of conduct" test.
The district court stated that the inextricably intertwined exception applied because it would have been difficult to confine
one's questioning to the facts and circumstances of one offense
without straying into a discussion of the other.268
The Ninth Circuit created a new "continuous course of conduct" test. 269 Thus, to decide whether the inextricably intertwined exception applies, a court should examine and compare
all of the facts and circumstances relating to the conduct involved, including the identity of the persons involved, and the
timing, motive, and location of the crimes. 270 In addition, no
single factor is dispositive. 271 The court stated that the greater
the commonality of the factors and the more the conduct is directly involved between the formal and subsequent offenses,
the two offenses will likely fall under the inextricably intertwined exception.272 Applying the "continuous course of conduct" test, the Ninth Circuit held that the kidnapping and
transportation of an illegal alien offenses were inextricably
d 273
. tert'
10
WIne.

267See id. The government's evidence alleges that the defendants unlawfully transported Hernandez, in re~kless disregard for his alien status and then unlawfully detained Hernandez against his will when he did not have sufficient funds to pay for his
transfer. See id. Because of the relatedness of the kidnapping and unlawful transport
charges, the defendants' Sixth Amendment right to counsel became effective as to both
offenses once defendants were assigned counsel during their state. court proceedings.
See id.

268

See Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants' Motion to Suppress at 9-10, United States v. Covarrubias (No. CR-98-2030-RHW, No. CR-98-2031RHW). The district court also held that even if the two offenses were not inextricably
intertwined, the Sixth Amendment attached for both offenses at the time of the state
court preliminary hearing because the two investigations and prosecutions were the
result of a joint effort between state and federal authorities. See id. at 9.
269 S
ee id.
270

271

S ee id. at 1225 n.6.
See id. (relying on the Third Circuit in Arnold, 106 F.3d at 41-42).

272 See id. (quoting Arnold, 106 F.3d at 41-42).
273 See Covarrubias, 179 F.3d at 1226. The Ninth Circuit held that the inextricably
intertwined exception applied for Seven reasons. See id. First, the timing of the federal
and state crimes overlapped in part in Sunnyside Washington while the defendants
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The Ninth Circuit rejected the government's contention that
274
the two offenses involved different time, place and persons.
Further, the Ninth Circuit rejected the government's argument
that the federal crime of transporting of an illegal alien was a
completed offense, but rather concluded that it was a continuing offense. 275 Consequently, the timing of the federal and
state crimes did overlap.276 Moreover, the defendants perpetrated both offenses: holding Hernandez for ransom and transporting Hernandez who was an illegal alien. 277 This overlap
persuaded the court that the two offenses involved a continuous course of conduct, not a separate and distinct course of
conduct. 278 Hernandez' role in both crimes supported this con279
clusion. The court added that, even if the defendants committed the federal crime in multiple locations, both crimes took

restrained Hernandez, an illegal alien, against his will in the Covarrubias' van .. See id.
at 1226. Second, the two offenses involved a continuous course of conduct because the
federal crime of transportation of an illegal alien continued by the time the defendants
detained Hernandez against his will. See id. Third, the defendants Covarrubias and
Ochoa were the perpetrators of both offenses. See id. Fourth, Hernandez was the victim in the kidnapping charge and one of the persons illegally transported in the other
crime. See Covarrubias, 179 F.3d at 1226. Fifth, both crimes took place, at least in
part, in Sunnyside, Washington. See id. Sixth, the defendants had an identical motive, obtaining remuneration, in committing both crimes. See id. Seventh, both
crimes arose from the same set of facts, the transportation of Hernandez. See id.

274

.

See Id. at 1225-1226. The government claimed that the defendants completed
the federal offense when the defendants left Los Angeles with the intention of transporting illegal aliens, whereas the kidnapping offense did not begin until they held
Hernandez for ransom in Washington. See Covarrubias, 179 F.3d at 1225 n.7. Thus,
the government argued that the state and federal offenses differed in the dates, times,
and locations, because the defendants completed the federal crime of transportation of
an illegal alien before the state kidnapping crime began. See id. The government also
contended that the victims of both crimes differed: Hernandez as the victim of kidnapping and the United States as the victim of the federal crime of transportation of an
illegal alien. See id.
275 See Covarrubias, 179 F.3d at 1225-1226.
276 See id.

277 See Id.
.

278 See id. The court stated that the transportation of illegal aliens continued for as
long as the defendants transported Hernandez. See id. at 1225-1226.
279 See Covarrubias, 179 F.3d at 1226. Hernandez was the victim of the kidnapping
offense and was one of the aliens of the transportation of illegal aliens, rather than
focusing on the issue who was the victim. See id.
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place at least in part in Washington, so the "continuous course
of conduct" test controlled. 2so
For the aforementioned reasons, the Ninth Circuit held that
the right to counsel, which had attached to the crime of kidnapping, extended to the uncharged federal crime of illegal
transportation of an illegal alien because both crimes were inextricably intertwined. 2s1 As a result, the questioning of Covarrubias and Ochoa by I.N.S. Agent Gonzalez regarding the uncharged offense of transportation of an illegal alien without the
presence of counsel constituted a violation of their Sixth
2S2
Amendment right to counsel. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the district court's decision to suppress the incriminating statements made by Covarrubias and Ochoa.283
V. CRITIQUE

The Ninth Circuit's conclusion is based solely on the applicability of the inextricably intertwined exception to the offense
specific requirement of the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel. 284 This note asserts that the Ninth Circuit's "continuous course of conduct" test runs counter to existing precedent.
In addition, the court should have applied the circumvention of
right exception instead of the in~xtricably intertwined exception.
The United States Supreme Court offers no guidelines for
applying the inextricably intertwined exception and has not
expressly adopted the inextricably intertwined exception.286 In
fact, the United States Supreme Court stands for the principle
that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is offense

2S0
2S1

2S2

See id.
•

See Covarrubr.as, 179 F.3d at 1226.
•

See id at 1226.
2S3 S
ee id.
284

See id. at 1223.

286 See United States v. Covarrubias, 179 F.3d 1219, 1224 (9th Cir. 1999). The
United States Supreme Court has only implicitly endorsed this exception. See id.
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specific. 288 Consequently, the circuit courts that have adopted
the inextricably intertwined exception have defined this exception narrowly and applied it sparingly.287 More specifically, the
majority of the courts that have recognized the inextricably
intertwined exception have rejected its application. 288 By contrast, the Ninth Circuit broadly construed and applied the inextricably intertwined exception. 289 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit's broad application in Unitea. States v. Covarrubias is unprecedented and questionable. Instead, the Ninth Circuit could
have suppressed the incriminating statements made by Covarrubias and Ochoa since I.N.S. Agent Gonzalez knowingly circumvented the defendants' Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
A. THE APPLICATION OF THE INEXTRICABLY INTERTWINED
EXCEPTION IN COVARRUBIAS IS TENUOUS

1. The Ninth Circuit Did Not Follow Its Own Precedent
Previous Ninth Circuit cases have defined the inextricably
. t ertwme
. d except'Ion narrowIy. 290 In Umte
. d S tates v. R'mes,291
m

the Ninth Circuit determined that the inextricably intertwined
exception did not apply for similar firearm offenses since time,
place and persons differed. 292 In Martinez, the Ninth Circuit
declined to extend the inextricably intertwined exception in286
See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
287
See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
288
See id.
289

See Covarrubias, 179 F.3d at 1225-1226 (adopting the "continuous course of conduct" test).

290 See United States v. Hines, 963 F.2d 255, 258 (9th Cir. 1992) (charged firearms

possession was not inextricably intertwined to the uncharged firearms offense, since
time, place, and per80ns differed); United States V. Martinez, 972 F.2d 1100, 11031105 (9th Cir. 1992) (the inextricably intertwined exception did not apply for two
similar firearms offenses, since the court was reluctant to extend the doctrine indefinitely after the state charge was dismissed); Hendricks V. Vasquez, 974 F.2d 1099,
1104-1105 (9th Cir. 1992) (the murder charge and interstate flight charge to avoid
murder charges were not inextricably intertwined, because each crime had totally
independent elements and did not arise from the same course of conduct).

291 See 963 F.2d 255 (9th Cir. 1992).
292
See Hines, 963 F.2d at 257-258.
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definitely to a subsequent firearm charge when the state dismissed the initial firearm offense. 293 .
Furthermore, in Hendricks v. Vasquez,294 the Ninth Circuit
utilized both the "same course of conduct" and "time, place,
and persons" tests to find that interstate flight to avoid prosecution of murder was not inextricably intertwined with the
underlying murder charge under either test. 295 The court concluded that the exception did not apply because one offense
predated the other and each offense had totally different proof
296
elements. These cases clearly demonstrate that the Ninth
circuit has previously defined the inextricably intertwined exception narrowly requiring identical time, place, and persons·
297
or identical elements of proof.
In Covarrubias, the kidnapping and transportation of an
illegal alien were not inextricably intertwined based on previous Ninth Circuit decisions because the time, place and per-

293

See Martinez, 972 F.2d at 1104-05. The Ninth Circuit found against the application of the inextricably intertwined exception, because a broad prophylactic application
of the Sixth Amendment runs counter to the reasoning of Moulton and McNeil, which
stressed both the narrow application of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and the
importance of allowing police to initiate and pursue investigations. See id. Implementation of this rule would mean that a federal agent could not question a suspect without first determining that that stat had not charged the suspect with a crime arising
out of the same acts which would needlessly frustrates the public'S interest. See id.
294
295

See 974 F.2d 1099 (9th Cir. 1992).
See id. at 1104-1105.

296

See id. The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that interstate flight to avoid prosecution for murder and the murder offense in San Francisco were related. See id. However, the two offenses have totally independent elements and the two offenses did not
arise from the same conduct. See id. Therefore; the court held that as uncharged and
distinct "additional crimes," they were not subject to the sixth amendment right to
counsel that attached when Hendricks was arraigned on his flight charge. See Hendricks, 974 F.2d at 1104-1105.
297 See Hines, 963 F.2d at 257-258. Even for the same exact offense that may be
closely related in time (December activities versus January activities), the exception
will not apply. See id. Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit becomes more reluctant to apply
the exception for two offenses that have totally different elements that are necessary
to prove the respective offenses and that did not arise from the same course of conduct. See Hendricks, 974 F.2d at 1104-1105.
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sons were not identical. 29S As a result, the Ninth Circuit could
not have suppressed Covarrubias' and Ochoa's incriminating
statements made to I.N.S. Agent Gonzalez under the time,
place, and persons test.
2. The Ninth Circuit Did Not Follow Other Circuits

The majority of federal circuit courts focus on whether underlying facts are the same for each offense before applying the
inextricably intertwined exception. 299 Thus, only under extremely narrow circumstances will the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel also attach to other offenses. 30o Despite the strong
presumption against applying the inextricably intertwined exception and the narrow interpretation of this exception by
other courts, the Ninth Circuit held that the "continuous
course of conduct" test controlled. 301 Using this broader test,
the Ninth Circuit implicitly states that the questioning by
I.N.S. Agent Gonzalez did not constitute a Sixth Amendment
right to counsel violation if confined to one of the preexisting
302
tests. Instead, the Ninth Circuit should have avoided this
unruly concept because the circumvention of the Sixth
Amendment right supplies an independent basis for suppres. 0f.d
s10n
eVl ence. 303

29S
299
300

See genero,lly Covarrubias, 179 F.3d at 1224-1226.
See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
See United States v. Williams, 993 F.2d 451, 456 (5th Cir. 1993).

3 0 1 . .

.

See Umted States v. CovarrubIas, 179 F.3d 1219, 1225-1226 (9th Clr. 1999). The
Ninth Circuit examined and compared all the facts and circumstances relating to the
conduct involved, including the identity of the persons involved, the timing, motive,
and location. See id.
302

The preexisting tests are: 1) nulceii of operative fact, United States v. Nocella, 849
F.2d 33, 38 (lst Cir. 1988); 2) factual predicate test, United States v. Kidd, 12 F.3d 30,
33 (4th Cir. 1993); 3) time, place, and persons, United States v. Hines, 963 F.2d 255,
258 (9th Cir. 1992); 4) same course of conduct, United States v. Cooper, 949 F.2d 737,
743-44 (5th Cir. 1991); same evidence, United States v. Mitcheltree, 940 F.2d 1329,
1342-43 (lOth Cir. 1991).
See Covarrubias, 179 F.3d at 1226 (recognizing that each exception, the inextricably intertwined and circumvention of right exceptions, provides an independent
basis for suppression of incriminating evidence when the government violated the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel).
303
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The Ninth Circuit held that the two offenses involved a continuous course of conduct such that one offense could not be
304
separated from the other. However, the Ninth Circuit's "continuous course of conduct" test is too broad. It is extremely difficult to determine whether an offense is continuous or completed to avoid violating the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Implementation of the "continuous course of conduct" test
would effectively prohibit a federal agent from questioning a
suspect without first determining that that state had not
charged the suspect with a crime arising out of the same acts.
Requiring such actions would needlessly frustrate the public's
interest in investigating new and additional crimes. 305 Furthermore, a federal agent will additionally have to determine if
the offense the defendant- is charged with is a continuing or a
completed offense before investigating any new offense. 306
The narrow interpretation and application within the Ninth
Circuit and other circuit courts militates against the finding
that the inextricably intertwined exception applies in Covarru304

See Covarrubias, 179 F.3d at 1225-1226. The federal crime of transporting an
illegal alien was a continuing offense as long as the defendants were transporting
Hernandez. See id. at 1225. The Ninth Circuit explained further that even if the federal offense had completed, the two offenses involved a continuous course of conduct.
See id. at 1225-1226.
305

See Martinez, 972 F.2d at 1104-1105. The Ninth Circuit found against the application of the inextricably intertwined exception, because a broad prophylactic application of the Sixth Amendment runs counter to the reasoning of Moulton and McNeil,
which stressed both the narrow application of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
and the importance of allowing police to initiate and pursue investigations. See id.
Furthermore, the Sixth Amendment does not create a sanctuary for the commission of
additional crimes during the pendency of an indictment. See United States v. Melgar,
139 F.3d 1005, 1014-1015 (4th Cir. 1998).
306 See Martinez, 972 F.2d at 1104-1105. The Ninth Circuit declined to extend the
inextricably intertwined exception indefinitely because it may prohibit investigation
on a second crime which may have no relation to the first. See id. It would require
suppression of a statement given to federal authorities regarding a federal crime if,
unbeknownst to the federal agents, the suspect had been charged for the same substantive act at some earlier time. See id. Furthermore, the government would be hampered if they had to check before hand before any investigation began to see if there
were any pending charges. See Melgar, 139 F.3d at 1014-1015. This requirement, the
Melgar court found would unnecessarily frustrate the public's interest in investigating
new and additional crimes. See id. The Melgar court reasoned that the inextricably
intertwined exception must be crafted to avoid hampering legitimate, necessary law
enforcement investigations. See id.
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bias. 307 First, the great weight of authority among those courts
which have adopted the inextricably intertwined exception
have narrowly defined the inextricably intertwined
exception. 308 Second, the majority of these courts have sparingly applied the inextricably intertwined exception. 309 In contrast, the Ninth Circuit went against the majority by applying
a broader "continuous course of conduct" test. Therefore, the
Ninth Circuit implicitly states that the facts in Covarrubias
would have insufficient to satisfy any of the previously existing
tests.
a. Time, Place, and Persons Test
The "time, place and persons" test requires that the time,
place, and persons be identical for both the charged and the
subsequent charge in order to suppress incriminating evidence
31o
under the inextricably intertwined exception.
If the Ninth
Circuit adopted the "time, place, and persons" test,311 I.N.S.
Agent Gonzalez's interrogation would not constitute a violation
of the defendants' Sixth Amendment right to counse1. 312
First, the two charges against Covarrubias and Ochoa did
not involve the same person. 313 Specifically, the kidnapping
charge involved only Hernandez while six other illegal aliens
314
participated in the federal transportation of an illegal alien.
307 See supra note 303 and accompanying text.
308 See id.
309 See supra note 5 and accompanymg
. text for a list of cases that have acknowledged, but rejected the application of the inextricably intertwined exception.

310
311

See Hines, 963 F.2d at 257-258.
See United States v. Hines, 963 F.2d 255, 257-258 (9th Cir. 1992).

See Covarrubias, 179 F.3d at 1225-1226. The Ninth Circuit side steps the time,
place, and persons test by arguing that the federal crime of transporting illegal immigrants was a continuing offense as long as the defendants were transporting Hernandez. See id.
313 See id. at 1221. The government argued that transportation of illegal aliens was
completed when the defendants left Los Angeles and that the state offense did not
begin until they began holding Hernandez for ransom. Therefore, the time, place, and
persons all differed. See id. at 1225 n.7.
314 See id .
312
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Further, Hernandez was the victim of kidnapping, while the
United States was the victim of the federal transportation of
an 1'11ega1 a l'len.315
Second, the timing and place also differed. 316 The crime of
transporting illegal aliens began· in California, whereas kidnapping of Hernandez did not occur until the Covarrubias and
317
Ochoa entered Washington. As a result, Washington did not
have jurisdiction to prosecute the alien transportation and the
federal government did not have jurisdiction to prosecute the
kidnapping case. 31S In addition, Covarrubias and Ochoa violated the federal law against transporting illegal aliens across
state borders when Covarrubias and Ochoa departed Los Angeles, California. 319 Thus, the Ninth Circuit would not have
been able to suppress the incriminating statements based upon
the "time, place, and persons" test.
b. Same Course of Conduct Test
The kidnapping and transportation of illegal aliens did not
satisfy the inextricably intertwined exception under the "same
course of conduct" test, which requires that the two offenses
arise from the same course of conduct. 32o Under the "continuous course of conduct" test, the Ninth Circuit focused on the
fact that the two crimes intersect at only one location, Sun-

315

See id. at 1225. "The victims of the two crimes are also different: technically the
United States was the victim of the crime of Transportation of an Illegal Alien. The
victim in the state kidnapping case was the alien, Martin Hernandez, and his family."
See Brief for Appellant at 19-20, United States v. Covarrubias, Order Granting in Part
and Denying in Part Defendant's Motion to Suppress (No. CA-98-30167).
316
317
31S

See Covarrubias, 179 F.3d at 1225.
See Appellants' Brief at 18-20, Covarrubias (No. CA-98-30167).
See id. at 20.

319

See id. at 18. The defendants could have been prosecuted for the federal crime of
transportation of an illegal alien in the Central District of California, the Northern
District of California, the District of Oregon, or the Eastern District of Washington
prior to being charged with kidnapping in Washington. See id.
320

See id. at 20. See also United States v. Cooper, 949 F.2d 737,743-744 (5th Cir.

1991).
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321
However, courts generally do not look
nyside, Washington.
at one point in time but the overall course of conduct in determining if both offenses arose from the "same course of con,,322
d uc.
t
In United States v. Cooper,323 the Fifth Circuit held that
when one offense predates the other, the two crimes do not
324
arise from the same course of conduct. Furthermore, the
325
Fifth Circuit in United States v. Walker held that even
though the same evidence may be used for the prosecution of
both offenses, the inextricably intertwined exception would not
apply so long as the two offenses involved two distinct types of
conduct. 326 In Walker, the offense of suborning perjury was not
inextricably intertwined with the possession of firearm offense
327
by a convicted felon, one not leading necessarily to the other.
Likewise, the crime of transporting illegal aliens and kidnapping did not arise from the same course of conduct. The
crime of transporting illegal aliens involved cooperation on the
part of the person being transferred, while the defendants in
the kidnapping charge required restraint. 328 Thus, though the
defendants may have had the same motive for each offense,329

321 See Covarrubias, 179 F.3d at 1226. The Ninth Circuit found that both crimes
took place, at least in part, in Sunnyside, Washington because the federal crime of
transporting illegal immigrants was a continuing offense. See id.
322 See, e.g., United States v. Walker, 148 F.3d 518, 529-530 (5th Cir. 1998); United
States V. Cooper, 949 F.2d 737,743-744 (5th Cir. 1991); United States V. Williams, 993
F.2d 451, 456-457 (5th Cir. 1993); United States V. Carpenter, 963 F.2d 736, 740741(5th Cir. 1992); United States V. Doherty, 126 F.3d 769, 776-777 (6th Cir. 1997).
323 See 942 F.2d 737 (5th Cir. 1991).
324
See id. at 744.
325 See 148 F.3d 518 (5th Cir. 1993).
326 See id. at 529-530.
327 See id.
328 See Appellants' Bnef
. at 19, CovarrubUUl
. (No. CA-98-30167).
329
.

See CovarrubUUl, 179 F.3d at 1225-1226. For example, Hernandez probably voluntarily entered Covarrubias's van and cooperated with the defendants in the commission of the federal crime of illegally transportation aliens. The defendants did,
however, had to restrain against Hernandez's will who was allegedly held for ransom
due to a dispute over payment.
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the defendant's conduct differed in fulfilling that goal under
each offense.
Furthermore, although the two crimes were related in time,
330
the purpose behind both differed. The purpose of illegally
transporting Hernandez was to evade immigration laws of the
United States in return for money.33l In contrast, the purpose
of the kidnapping was to hold Hernandez for ransom due to a
dispute over money. 332 Moreover, the federal crime of transpor333
tation of an illegal alien predated the kidnapping offense.
Consequently, the two offenses did not arise from the same
course of conduct. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit would not have
been able to suppress the incriminating statements based upon
the "same course of conduct" test.
c. Factual Predicate Test
Additionally, the kidnapping and transportation of an illegal alien offenses were not inextricably intertwined under the
334
"factual predicate" test. The Fourth Circuit in United States
335
v. Kidd held that even when the defendant is charged with
the same offense, the inextricably intertwined exception does
not apply if the factual predicate needed to accomplish each
336
crime differs. Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit suggested
that the government would have violated Kidd's Sixth
Amendment right to counsel if the sale of cocaine had involved
the same time, place, and persons. 337 Therefore, the Fourth
330
331

See id.
See id.

332 See id. at 1221.
333 See, e.g., Cooper, 949 F.2d at 743-744 (robbery offense predated firearm offense);
Carpenter, 963 F.2d at 741(burglary offense predated firearm offense). Similarly, the
transportation of illegal aliens, which completed when Covarrubias and Ochoa left
California with the knowing intention to transport an illegal alien, predated the kidnapping offense which did not begin until the defendants were in Washington.
334
335

See United States v. Kidd, 12 F.3d 30, 33 (4th Cir. 1993).
See 12 F.3d 30 (4th Cir. 1993)

336 See id. at 34
337 See id. at 33.
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Circuit concluded that the similar drug sale involved new
criminal activity that was factually distinct from the prior of~
338
lense.
Similarly, the subsequent crime of kidnapping involved new
criminal activity.339 The federal offense began when the defendants knowingly transported the illegal aliens out of California, whereas kidnapping did not occur until the defendants
restrained the victim-alien while holding him for ransom in
34o
Sunnyside, Washington. Further, unlike Kidd, the two offenses were not identical. 341 Hence, the Ninth Circuit would
not have been able to suppress the incriminating statements
based upon the "factual predicate" test.
d. Nucleii of Operative Fact Test
In addition, the inextricably intertwined exception does not
apply to the kidnapping and transportation of an illegal alien
offenses under the "nucleii of operative fact" test.342 The First
343
Circuit in United States v. Nocella held that two offenses are
inextricably intertwined if they arise out of a common nucleii
344
of operative fact. The First Circuit held that if the proof elements for each offense differ, then the inextricably intertwined
exception does not apply.345 The First Circuit rejected the application of the inextricably intertwined exception because pos-

338 See id.
339 See Brief for the State at 20, Covarrubias (No. 98-30167).
340
See id.

341 See generally United States v. Covarrubias, 179 F.3d 1219 (9th Cir. 1999). It
should be noted that the offenses in Kidd. involved two similar drug offenses, whereas,
the offenses in Covarrubias involved two different offenses: kidnapping and transportation of an illegal alien.
342
See generally Nocella, 849 F.2d at 37-38.
343
See 849 F.2d 33 (lst Cir. 1988).
344 See id. at 37-38.

345 See id. Marijuana and cocaine offenses necessitated disparate proof element,
and therefore, the inextricably intertwined exception does not apply. See id.
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session of marijuana and cocaine offenses necessitated disparate proof eI ements. 346
Similarly, in Covarrubias, the kidnapping and transportation of illegal aliens charges required disparate elements of
proof. Specifically, transportation of an illegal alien requires
that the defendant must knowing or with reckless disregard
transport or move a person who is not a citizen. 347 In contrast,
kidnapping requires that the defendant must intentionally abduct another person with intent to hold him for ransom or reward, or as a shield or hostage kidnapping. 348 Kidnapping does
not require that the defendant have knowledge or reckless disregard that the person the defendant is holding is not a
citizen. 349 Further, transportation of illegal alien does not require that the defendant intends to hold the person for ransom,
reward, shield, or as a hostage. 35o In Covarrubias, Hernandez
voluntarily entered Covarrubias' van and through the joint
effort between Covarrubias, Hernandez, and Ochoa. 351 Together they completed the transportation of an illegal alien
offense so that Hernandez could remain in the United States. 352
On the other hand, Covarrubias and Ochoa together detained
Hernandez against his will due to a dispute over a payment. 353
Thus, the crime of kidnapping and transportation of an illegal
alien did not satisfy the "nucleii of operative fact" test.

346

See id.

See 18, U.S.C § 1324(a)(1)(B). The elements of transportation of an illegal alien
are: the defendant knowingly or with reckless disregard transported or attempted to
move a person who is not a citizen of the United States in order to help the person
transported remain in the United States. See id.
347

348
349

350
351
352
353

See Revised Code of Washington 9A.040.020.
See id.

d.
See supra note 394 an accompanymg text.
.

See ,d.
See Covarrubias, 179 F.3d at 1221-1222.
id

S ee

.
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e. Same Evidence Test
In United States v. Mitcheltree,354 the Tenth Circuit evaluated whether the two offenses involved the same evidence to
355
identify when two offenses are inextricably intertwined. The
Tenth Circuit found that the inextricably intertwined exception applied, because the incriminating statements obtained by
the police related directly to both the drug distribution and
. 0 ffienses. 356
WI'tness t ampenng
Similarly, Agent Gonzalez questioned Covarrubias and
Ochoa regarding both the kidnapping and transportation of
illegal alien charges. 357 However, the Tenth Circuit considered
"same evidence" with respect to proof elements; it did apply the
test when the offenses were related in other ways.358 However,
in Covarrubias, the evidence related to both offenses but were
not directly linked with regard to proof elements. 359 Addition360
ally, the Fifth Circuit stated in United States v. Cooper that
the two offenses are not inextricably intertwined if one offense
predates the other offense, even if the two cases would utilize
361
essentially the same evidence in prosecuting the defendant.
For the aforementioned reasons, the evidence did not satisfy
the Tenth Circuit's definition of the "same evidence" because
kidnapping and transportation of illegal alien requires disparate proof elements. 362 Hence, the Ninth Circuit would not have
been able to suppress the incriminating statements based upon
the "same evidence" test.

354
See 940 F.2d 1329 (lOth Cir. 1991).
355
See id. at 1344.
356
See id. at 1344-1345.

357 See Covarrubias, 179 F.3d at 1222 n.2, n.4.
358
See Mitcheltree, 940 F.2d at 1344-1345.

359 See Brief for the State at 19-20, Covarrubias (No. 98-30167) (stating that the
kidnapping offense and transportation of an illegal alien necessitated disparate proof
elements).
360 See 949 F.2d 737(5th Cir. 1991).
361

See id. at 744.

362 See 18, U.S.C § 1324(a)(1)(B); Revised Code of Washington 9A.040.020.
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B. THE NINTH CIRCUIT SHOULD HAVE APPLIED THE
CIRCUMVENTION OF RIGHT EXCEPTION

The Ninth Circuit should have suppressed the defendants'
incriminating evidence based upon on the circumvention of
right exception. Unlike the inextricably intertwined exception,
the United States Supreme Court expressly endorsed this exception in Maine v. Moulton. 363 A majority of federal circuit and
state supreme courts have adopted the circumvention of right
· In
. the same manner. 3M
except Ion
For example, in United States v. Mitcheltree,365 the Tenth
Circuit suppressed statements regarding drug charges although the government purported to investigate witness tampering. 366 The Tenth Circuit characterized the interview as a
knowing circumvention of defendant's Sixth Amendment right
to counsel. 367 Therefore, the right to counsel attached to both
the charged and uncharged offenses for two reasons. 368 First, as
in Moulton, the police knew that the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel attached to defendant's drug charges. 369 Second, the
informant's open-ended questions made it virtually certain
that the defendant would discuss the details of the pending
drug charges. 37o
Like Moulton and Mitcheltree, the Ninth Circuit should
have suppressed the statements based on the circumvention of
right exception. Agent Gonzalez knew or should have known
that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel had attached to the

363

,3M

See Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159,171 (1985).
.
See supra note 6 and accompanymg text.

365

See United States v. Mitcheltree, 940 F.2d 1329 (10th Cir. 1991).

366

See id. at 1344-1345.
S ee id.

367
368

.

See Id.

369

See id. at 1335.

370

See Mitcheltree, 940 F.2d 1340-1341.
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defendants' charge of kidnapping. 371 In addition, Agent Gonzalez asked open-ended questions which were likely to elicit
incriminating statements regarding the kidnapping charge. 372
Furthermore, Agent Gonzalez did not confine his questions
solely to the issue of transportation of illegal aliens. 373 Moreover, Agent Gonzalez participated in the planning of the arrest
of the two defendants as well the arrest itself. 374 Finally, the
state dismissed the state charge in exchange for an alleged
promise of a federal conviction arising out of the same
375
incident. Agent Gonzalez deliberately sought to circumvent
the prohibition of questioning in respect to the kidnapping
charge by participating in the arrest of Ochoa and Covarrubias
and asking open-ended questions.
As in Covarrubias, when evidence indicates that the police

deliberately sought to circumvent the defendants' Sixth
Amendment right to counsel protection, the Ninth Circuit
should have granted Covarrubias' and Ochoa's Motion to Suppress based on this exception.
'VI. CONCLUSION
The Covarrubias decision illustrates the uncertainty and
ambiguity of the inextricably intertwined exception. Given that
most courts have narrowly interpreted and applied the inextricably intertwined exception sparingly,376 the Ninth Circuit in
Covarrubias improperly applied this exception. As such, the
Ninth Circuit has added to the confusion between the circuits
as to which test governs the application of the inextricably in371 See Covarrubias, 179 F.3d at 1222 n.3. Agent Gonzalez argued that he did not in
fact know that the defendants' Sixth Amendment right to counsel had attached to the
kidnapping crime. See id. However, given Agent Gonzalez's experience, the Ninth
Circuit imputed knowledge that the defendants' had been arraigned and appointed
counsel. See id.
372 See supra note 26 and accompanymg
. text.
373 See id.
374 See Covarrubias, 179 F.3d at 1221.
375 See id. at 1222.
376 See supra note 5 and accompanymg
. text.
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tertwined exception. Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit should
have suppressed the defendants' statement based on the circumvention of right exception. Courts generally have applied
the circumvention of right exception more broadly on a showing that the government breached its affirmative obligation not
to circumvent the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The facts
in Covarrubias demonstrate that I.N.S. Agent Gonzalez
knowingly circumvented Covarrubias and Ochoa's Sixth
Amendment right to counsel. 377
Therefore, the Ninth Circuit could have suppressed the defendants' incriminating statements relying solely on the circumvention of right exception because each exception provides
378
an independent basis for suppression. The court should have
avoided the issue concerning the split as to which test applies
for the inextricably intertwined exception. To aid these circuit
courts, the United States Supreme Court should expressly endorse the inextricably intertwined exception. Should the Court
decide to endorse the inextricably intertwined exception, the
Court.must resolve the split as to which test to apply and spell
out the parameters for when the inextricably intertwined exception applies.

Holly Larsen"

377

See supra notes 364-376 and accompanying text.

378

See id. at 1226.
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